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ABSTRACT 
 
 The architecture of dynamic security assessment processing system (DSAPS) is 
proposed to address online dynamic security assessment (DSA) with focus of the 
dissertation on low-probability, high-consequence events. DSAPS upgrades current 
online DSA functions and adds new functions to fit into the modern power grid. 
 Trajectory sensitivity analysis is introduced and its applications in power system 
are reviewed. An index is presented to assess transient voltage dips quantitatively using 
trajectory sensitivities. Then the framework of anticipatory computing system (ACS) for 
cascading defense is presented as an important function of DSAPS. ACS addresses 
various security problems and the uncertainties in cascading outages. Corrective control 
design is automated to mitigate the system stress in cascading progressions. The 
corrective controls introduced in the dissertation include corrective security constrained 
optimal power flow, a two-stage load control for severe under-frequency conditions, and 
transient stability constrained optimal power flow for cascading outages. 
With state-of-the-art computing facilities to perform high-speed extended-term 
time-domain simulation and optimization for large-scale systems, DSAPS/ACS 
efficiently addresses online DSA for low-probability, high-consequence events, which 
are not addressed by today’s industrial practice. Human interference is reduced in the 
computationally burdensome analysis.  
Equation Chapter (Next) Section 1 
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1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction to Power System Dynamic Security Assessment 
Security assessment has always been an important topic in power system 
operation. It refers to the analysis and quantification of the degree and risk in a power 
system’s ability to survive imminent disturbances (contingencies) without interruption to 
customer service [1]. Corresponding actions are designed and applied, if necessary, to 
reduce the risk.  
The security assessment of power systems includes steady-state security 
assessment (SSA) and dynamic security assessment (DSA). SSA studies the system 
steady state operating points between dynamic transitions, whereas DSA focuses on the 
security of system dynamics in various timescales, from transients of several seconds to 
slow dynamics of several minutes or even hours. 
In DSA, many security aspects of power systems are assessed, including 
transmission line thermal loading, voltage, rotor angles and frequency deviation. This is 
very computationally burdensome and requires many efforts. Historically, DSA is 
performed only off-line. The system dynamic security is assessed under forecasted 
operating scenarios, which should be exhaustive to cover the uncertainties. On the other 
hand, online DSA relies only on current operating scenario and assesses the ongoing 
real-time (or near real-time) dynamic security status, thus is able to give timely control 
actions to maintain system stability.  
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1.2 Motivation  
In recent years, tremendous progress has been made in implementing DSA, 
especially online DSA, in power industry [2]. One important reason is that the new 
development of computing technologies makes feasible the once computationally 
burdensome and thus formidable analysis for online DSA. State-of-the-art computing 
facilities, even personal computers, have substantially shortened the computing time. 
According to Moore’s law [3], the processing speed and memory capacity of the 
computing facilities are still improving at roughly exponential rates. Besides the 
conventional CPU-based single-core computing types, wider territories are being 
explored to further accelerate the computing speed. High-performance computing (HPC) 
is becoming more important and even essential in areas where computing bottlenecks are 
met with their old computing technologies. The hardware enhancement in HPC includes 
supercomputers with many cores and nonconventional computing platforms such as 
GPUs and FPGAs. The list of the top 500 supercomputer sites in the world can be found 
in [4].  Some of them are national laboratories under the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE), such as Oak Ridge National Lab, Argonne National Lab, Lawrence Livermore 
National Lab and Sandia National Lab. This dissertation does not focus on how to use 
HPC facilities in power system DSA. Rather, it is assumed in the dissertation that we 
have such high-speed computing facilities to realize the proposed architecture of online 
DSA, which would be impossible if considered years ago.   
In addition, we are facing new challenges in power industry. The power grid is 
experiencing more severe blackouts, which usually involve cascading outages. The 
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large-scale blackouts are low-probability, high-consequence events because they are rare 
but may cause great economical loss if they occur [5]. Based on the experience of the 
major blackouts around the world, DSA has been indicated as an important issue that 
should be considered to mitigate the low-probability, high-consequence events [6]. 
Traditional off-line DSA tries to analyze the low-probability, high-consequence events 
exhaustively, but is subject to uncertainties and computing capabilities especially when 
cascading outages are involved. With state-of-the-art computing facilities, power 
engineers are seeking for new strategies to monitor and control the modern power grids 
online to enhance power system dynamic security and prevent large-scale blackouts. 
Thus, there is need to further inspect existing power system DSA functions and design a 
architecture that better fits into the modern power industry.  
1.3 Dynamic Security Assessment Processing System 
This dissertation designs dynamic security assessment processing system 
(DSAPS) to improve existing online DSA industrial practice and add new functions 
taking advantage of fast computing facilities and communication technologies. Figure 
1.1 shows the major components of current online DSA implementation in industry [7]. 
The architecture of DSAPS in Figure 1.2 shows the changes and additional functions (in 
highlighted boxes) compared with existing industrial practice of online DSA. DSAPS 
enables power system operators to have a better sense of system dynamic security and 
provides them with technical support for online decision-making to enhance power 
system dynamic security.  
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Figure 1.1 Existing DSA implementation in industry 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Architecture of DSAPS 
5 
 
 
Compared with current online DSA industrial practice, DSAPS possesses the 
following promising features: 
 DSAPS contains a suite of tools designed for analysis that is more 
comprehensive than existing online DSA. 
 DSAPS harnesses the power of fast computing and communication technologies. 
 DSA addresses both high-probability events and low-probability events. 
 For low-probability events, DSAPS analyzes cascading outages and automates 
the design of corrective controls to mitigate the high consequences and prevent 
large-scale blackouts that involve cascading outages.  
The two classes of events: high-probability events and low-probability events are 
addressed by DSAPS in what follows: 
High-probability events: The main feature of this class of events is that, 
because of their high likelihood, preventive actions are performed to ensure their 
consequences (or impact), should they occur, are low and satisfy reliability criteria. This 
class of events includes NERC category B and C events. Today’s online DSA addresses 
such events.  
Low-probability events: The main feature of this class of events is that, because 
of their low likelihood, preventive actions to mitigate their consequences are not 
performed, since reliability criteria does not require it and since it costs money to do so. 
Normally, events in this class would be NERC category D events. Today’s online DSA 
does not address these events.   
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1.4 Dissertation Contributions 
This dissertation addresses a subset of the DSAPS function blocks as starred in 
Figure 1.2. The corresponding contributions are introduced in the following: 
 Trajectory sensitivity analysis is a significant tool that serves the contingency 
analysis and control design for DSAPS. The applications of trajectory sensitivity 
analysis in power systems are reviewed. 
 One important feature of trajectory sensitivity analysis is its ability to estimate 
the trajectory change with system parameter variation. This feature is used in the 
control design for DSAPS. The estimation is based on an assumption that the 
system parameter variation is small such that the system nonlinearity does not 
affect the analysis. For large variations, two strategies, i.e., second order 
trajectory sensitivity and switching operating state method, can be used to refine 
the estimation accuracy. 
 A trajectory sensitivity application for contingency analysis in the dissertation is 
a designed index, voltage related critical clearing time (V-CCT). V-CCT is a 
single index that comprehensively and efficiently assesses transient voltage dips. 
 Addressing low-probability, high-consequence events is an important function of 
DSAPS. Anticipatory computing system (ACS) is proposed. ACS is a framework 
for automated corrective control design, specialized for cascading defense to 
prevent large-scale blackouts. A generalized corrective security constrained 
optimal power flow is formulated and efficiently solved to determine control 
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decisions including dispatch, load shedding and generation voltage setting that 
can be applied in the progression of cascading outages to address various system 
performance violations and mitigate system stress. Other controls designed for 
ACS are as follows: 
 A two-stage load control scheme for severe under-frequency conditions is 
proposed. The first stage is event-based open-loop under-frequency load 
shedding that guarantees fast response to high-consequence contingencies in 
order to maintain system stability. Mixed integer programming problems are 
formulated and solved to determine the minimum amount of load to shed to 
maintain system stability. In the second stage, response-based close-loop model 
predictive control further curtails interruptible loads to recover the system 
frequency.   
 A transient stability constrained optimal power flow (TSCOPF) is proposed. 
Trajectory sensitivities are used to improve the efficiency of TSOPF through 
estimating rotor angles after change of generation levels. TSCOPF is further 
improved and implemented for cascading defense.  
1.5 Dissertation Organization  
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces trajectory 
sensitivity analysis. A review of trajectory sensitivity applications for power 
system analysis is first provided. An index for quantitative assessment of 
transient voltage dips using trajectory sensitivities is introduced. Then two 
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strategies are presented to improve the accuracy of trajectory sensitivity-based 
approximation. Chapter 3 introduces the design of ACS for cascading defense. 
The formulation of a corrective security constrained optimal power flow 
embedded in ACS is provided. Chapter 4 introduces a two-stage load control 
scheme for severe under-frequency conditions. Chapter 5 introduces TSCOPF for 
preventive control. TSCOPF is then extended for cascading defense. Chapter 6 
provides the summary and software implementation.  
 Equation Chapter (Next) Section 1 
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2. CHAPTER 2: ANALYSIS TOOL: TRAJECTORY 
SENSITIVITY 
This chapter introduces trajectory sensitivity analysis. The basic knowledge of 
trajectory sensitivity analysis is first introduced, including its categorized applications in 
power systems and a primary example to show dynamic trajectory estimation with 
parameter change using trajectory sensitivities. An index, called voltage critical clearing 
time (V-CCT), is then proposed to assess transient voltage dips quantitatively after high-
consequence events based on trajectory sensitivity analysis. The estimation error using 
trajectory sensitivity is addressed using second order trajectory sensitivities and 
switching operating states methods. 
2.1 Trajectory Sensitivity Analysis 
2.1.1 Introduction 
Trajectory sensitivity is a strong tool for dynamic system analysis, and has been 
used in various areas such as control and power systems. This chapter introduces the 
concept of trajectory sensitivity, including its efficient calculation and primary 
applications.   
The structure of the power system model for dynamic security assessment is 
shown in Figure 2.1 [8]. 
10 
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Figure 2.1 Structure of power system model for dynamic analysis 
 
Mathematically, the dynamics can be expressed by a set (or several sets) of 
differential algebraic equations (DAE) as 
 ( , , )x f x y     (2.1) 
 0 ( , , )g x y    (2.2) 
where x is the vector of state variables such as rotor angles and rotor speed, y is the 
vector of algebraic variables such as voltages, and  is the vector of model parameters 
such as generation levels, load levels and transmission line impedances;   may also 
include simulation-specific parameters such as contingency clearing time.  
Taking the first derivative of the DAE above with respect to any element of   
gets another set of DAE, as 
 x yx f x f y f        (2.3) 
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 x yx f x f y f        (2.4) 
Equations (2.3)-(2.4) are augmentations of the original equations (2.1)-(2.2). 
Solving for (2.1)-(2.4) together will yield trajectories of all variable as well as their 
trajectories of first derivatives with respect to that particular 
parameter x yx f x f y f      , and those additional trajectories are called trajectory 
sensitivities, i.e. 
( ) ( )
x
t x t



 and ( ) ( )
y
t y t



. 
2.1.2 Survey on Trajectory Sensitivity Applications in Power Systems 
Reference [9] presented some results of sensitivity analysis in power system 
trajectories. In [10], the power system applications of trajectory sensitivities were 
classified. Considerable promising new work has arisen since then. In this section, a 
survey is presented to summarize the state-of-the-art achievements of trajectory 
sensitivity applications in power systems. The applications are categorized into several 
areas. Each area has its own focus but is not rigorously distinguished from other areas. 
A. Trajectory Sensitivity Analysis 
Several key problems need to be solved in trajectory sensitivity applications. One 
is the computational efficiency. It was proved in [11] that, if implicit methods such as 
trapezoidal rule are used for integration and the Newton method is selected to solve 
nonlinear equations, the effort of calculating trajectory sensitivities is negligible 
12 
 
 
compared with time-domain simulation. In [12], cluster computing further speeded up 
the calculation of many trajectory sensitivities.  
The discrete event analysis is also crucial to trajectory sensitivity analysis. 
Reference [11] suggested a method to deal with the estimation mismatch caused by the 
junction conditions at discrete events. In [13], the estimation error variation with 
parameter perturbation magnitudes was analyzed.  
B. System Assessment 
  Variations of some parameters have severe impact on the system behavior, 
whereas others not. This impact can be measured by trajectory sensitivities. And the 
trajectory sensitivity magnitudes tends to increase when the system is more stressed [13]. 
Reference [14] is the first trajectory sensitivity application of an actual event. The 
Nordel power grid disturbance of January 1st, 1997 was analyzed, to identify the critical 
lines, the influence of shunt reactor and the importance of generator tripping in the 
disturbance. The focus of [14] was to qualitatively assess the system heath status by 
comparing the magnitudes of the trajectory sensitivities. Similar work includes [15] for 
short term voltage stability assessment, [16] for transient rotor angle stability, and [17] 
for transient voltage dips.  
On the other hand, some work quantitatively assessed the estimated trajectories 
after parameter change. Transient voltages were assessed  based on their trajectory 
sensitivities with respect to contingency clearing time [18], dispatch [19], load shedding 
[20] and induction motors [21]. Rotor angle stability was assessed based on the 
trajectory sensitivities to dispatch [22], generator model parameters [23] and 
13 
 
 
contingency clearing time [24]. Trajectory sensitivities provide useful information of the 
system dynamic security that is not available from only time-domain simulation. 
Another direction to use trajectory sensitivities for quantitative assessment is to 
determine the system operating limits through linear approximation. Using trajectory 
sensitivities avoids repetitive trial-and-error simulations that provide accurate results but 
bring much computational burden. The operating limits include rotor angle limits [25, 
26] and short term voltage limits [27], due to the variation of contingency clearing time, 
real/reactive power dispatch and load shedding.  
C. System Design 
The sensitivity information helps identify the locations where the devices 
perform most effectively. Reference [28] determined the locations of series-connected 
controllers. Reference [29] identified the locations for dynamic VAr support to mitigate 
the short term voltage instability problem caused by large disturbances.  
To determine the optimal values of system parameters, the system design solve 
optimization problems. Reference [30] used trajectory sensitivities to design controllers 
for the static synchronous compensators (STATCOM). Reference [31] designed robust 
power system stabilizer parameters. In [32], synchronous generator and excitation 
system parameters were identified using trajectory sensitivities.  
D. Operation and Control 
Similar to system design, control actions are also designed by solving 
optimization problems. To consider dynamic security, time-domain simulation involves 
14 
 
 
and occupies most of the optimization time. One efficient way of speeding up the 
optimization is to perform the base-case time-domain simulation and calculate the 
corresponding trajectory sensitivities, which can interpolate the evaluating trajectories 
after change of the optimization control variables.  
In recent years, transient stability constrained optimal power flow (TSCOPF) has 
drawn some attention. Some work on TSCOPF added transient stability constraints 
obtained based on trajectory sensitivities with respect to generation levels. Reference 
[33] used trajectory sensitivities for kinetic energy calculation and imposed energy 
related constraints to secure transient stability. Reference [34] calculated long term rotor 
angle trajectory sensitivities with respect to generation levels during peak hours based on 
the day-ahead scheduled dispatch, and then transient stability constraints were added to 
economic dispatch problems. Reference [35] considered transient rotor stability under 
multiple contingencies. 
Many model predictive control (MPC) cases in nonlinear system situations 
incorporate trajectory sensitivities. The control actions are determined by forming 
optimization problems that use trajectory sensitivities to approximate the variable 
behavior, to facilitate the computational efficiency. The control objectives in power 
systems analysis are mainly to strengthen voltage stability through various strategies, 
such as load shedding [36] and reactive power compensation [37, 38]. 
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2.1.3 Dynamic Trajectory Estimation after Parameter Change using Trajectory 
Sensitivities 
A very important feature of trajectory sensitivity is the ability of dynamic 
trajectory estimation after parameter change. This feature has been utilized in various 
areas introduced above. An example is introduced in the following. 
It can be observed that trajectory sensitivity interprets the change of system 
variables (x and y) with change of parameter  . This feature significantly helps reduce 
the burden of power system time-domain simulation. This is because time-domain 
simulation is for a specific scenario, and if there is change of a parameter such as 
generation or load, simulation should be performed again. Trajectory sensitivity can 
estimate the resulting trajectories after the parameter change. Suppose a set of variable 
trajectories x*(t) is obtained, and after that there is a slight change of parameter  , then 
the resulting trajectories of variables can be estimated as 
 ( ) *( ) ( )x t x t x t    .  (2.5) 
Note that, estimation using  (2.5) is actually based on Taylor’s series expansion, that is  
 ( ) ( ) higher order terms
1!
x
x x          .  (2.6) 
Equation (2.5) neglects higher terms. Because power systems are nonlinear systems, 
there will be estimation error, especially when the parameter change is comparably 
large.  
New England 39-bus system is used for testing. The one-single diagram of the 
test system is shown in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2 One-line diagram of New England 39-bus system 
 
Scenario: Fault at bus 3, cleared by tripping line from bus 3 to bus 4, after 0.1 second. 
Trajectory sensitivities of rotor angles with respect to generator 30 are shown in 
Figure 2.3.  Then generation at generator 30 was shifted from 2.5 p.u. to 2.1 p.u., which 
is a 16% decrease. This shift was compensated by the generator 39 at swing bus.  There 
are changes of two parameters, i.e., the generation levels of generator 30 and the 
generator at swing bus. Since trajectory sensitivities are linear, they can be added up 
together, i.e., 
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 30 30 39 39( ) *( ) ( ) ( )G Gr t r t r t G r t G       (2.7) 
where *( )r t  is base-case generator 30 rotor angle trajectory; 30Gr and 39Gr are trajectory 
sensitivities of generator 30 rotor angle with respect to generation levels of generator 30 
and 39, respectively; ( )r t  is generator 30 rotor angle after the generation shift.  
Figure 2.4 shows the base-case generator 30 rotor angle trajectory, and the 
trajectories after generation shift, obtained through simulation and estimation. It is 
observed from Figure 2.4 that the estimated trajectory almost perfectly tracked the one 
obtained through time-domain simulation. Therefore, the trajectory sensitivity shows its 
excellent ability in dynamic estimation of rotor angle trajectories after change of 
generation levels. This provides very useful information that will be used later in this 
report for the trajectory sensitivity based transient stability constrained optimal power 
flow.  
 
Figure 2.3 Rotor angle trajectory sensitivity w.r.t. generator 30 
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Figure 2.4 Trajectories of generator 33 rotor angle 
2.2 Quantitative Transient Voltage Dip Assessment of Contingencies 
using Trajectory Sensitivities 
2.2.1 Motivation and contribution 
Transient voltage dip (TVD) refers to the short term voltage magnitude reduction 
after faults or other disturbances, such as transformer energizing, large motor starting 
and heavy load switching [39], that result in extreme increase of currents. TVD is an 
important aspect of power quality. Severe TVD brings high consequences in various 
industry areas [40-43]. To avoid TVD, time-domain simulations must be done and 
preventive actions taken when unacceptable TVD is detected [44]. Here a new index is 
presented to facilitate fast TVD assessment after fault-initiated contingencies.  
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There is a significant body of literature on assessing TVD.  In [45], the IEC and 
IEEE TVD standards and application areas were reviewed. Reference [46] presented 
various TVD indices relating voltage dip duration and energy variation. Reference [47] 
developed a TVD index considering compatibility between equipment and supply. The 
TVD duration assessment criteria were summarized in [48] from various industry 
resources. Some other TVD assessment standards include voltage dip window criterion 
[49] and economic cost [50]. In [51, 52], stochastic methods were presented for TVD 
assessment.  
Inspired by critical clearing time (CCT), a familiar  metric to indicate power 
system rotor angle stability [53, 54], an index called voltage critical clearing time (V-
CCT) is proposed. The system dynamic security subject to fault-initiated contingencies 
is quantified by fast estimation of V-CCT. To obtain V-CCT, voltage trajectory 
sensitivities with respect to fault clearing time are first calculated. The calculated 
trajectory sensitivity information is used to estimate V-CCT, which is defined as the 
maximum fault clearing time for which the limit of TVD dynamic security region is 
reached. V-CCT is a comprehensive index, because it considers multiple TVD dynamic 
performance criteria that define the TVD dynamic security region. Using trajectory 
sensitivities to calculate V-CCT avoids time-consuming repetitive trial-and-error time-
domain simulations to obtain those critical values. The calculated V-CCT are used to 
rank the TVD severity of assessed contingencies.  
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2.2.2 Trajectory Sensitivities w.r.t. Fault Clearing Time 
The dynamics of a power system considering switching actions can be described 
by a differential algebraic equations (DAE) as [55] 
 ( , , , )x f x y t    (2.8) 
 
( , , , ) ( , , , ) 0
0
( , , , ) ( , , , ) 0
g x y t s x y t
g x y t s x y t
 
 


 
 

  (2.9) 
where x are dynamic state variables, y are algebraic variables and λ are system 
parameters and initial conditions. Examples of system parameters are transmission line 
impedances, generation levels and load parameters. To calculate V-CCT, the system 
parameter λ considered in the dissertation is fault clearing time tcl. The discontinuity of 
the system is represented by switching between algebraic equations, denoted by 
superscripts “‒” and “+”. A switching event occurs when the trigger function equals 
zero, i.e., s(x, y, tcl) = 0. g
‒
 represents the period of time during the fault (the fault-on 
period), and g
+  
the period of time after the fault (the post-fault period).  
To better understand the post-fault trajectory sensitivities with respect to tcl, the 
differential equations are also represented with a fault-on set f
 ‒
 and a post-fault set f
 +
. 
Since f are continuous, f
 ‒
  = f
 + 
is satisfied at tcl.  
References [11, 16, 56] studied trajectory sensitivities with respect to both 
system parameters and initial conditions. Change of fault clearing time tcl is a special 
case, because it results in the initial condition deviations of all variables for the post-fault 
period. Differentiating the post-fault part of the DAE yields 
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2
cl tcl tcl tcl
x f x f y f
t t x y
       
  
      
  (2.10) 
 0
tcl tcl tcl
g x g y g
x y
      
  
    
 . (2.11) 
DAE (2.8) and (2.9) describe a time-variant system, in which time t is an 
independent variable but not explicitly expressed, thus ∂f +/∂tcl = 0 and ∂g
 +/∂tcl = 0 are 
satisfied. Define 
2
tcl
cl
x
x
t t


 
, tcl
cl
x
x
t



 , x
f
f
x

 

and x
g
g
x

 

. 
The trajectory sensitivity equations (2.10) and (2.11) become 
 x
g
g
x

 

  (2.12) 
 0
cl clx t y t
g x g y     (2.13) 
Both x(t, tcl) and y(t, tcl) vary with tcl. Given a small change in fault clearing time 
Δtcl, the resulting deviation of a variable trajectory is estimated through Taylor series 
expansion as 
 
( , ) ( , ) higher order terms
( , ) ( , ) ( )
cl
cl cl cl cl
cl
cl cl t cl cl cl
cl
t t t t t t
t
t t t t t t t t
t





     


    

  (2.14) 
where φ = [x, y].  
For a specific pre-fault operation condition, changing fault clearing time affects 
only fault-on trajectories and post-fault trajectories. The initial conditions of post-fault 
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trajectory sensitivities for dynamic state variables are obtained using the fact that they 
are variable sensitivities to time t at tcl. i.e., 
 ( , ) ( , , , ) ( , , , )
cl
cl cl
t cl cl cl clt t t t
x t t f x y t t f x y t t 
 
  .  (2.15) 
The initial conditions of post-fault trajectory sensitivities for algebraic variables are 
obtained from (2.13) as 
 
  1( , )cl cl
cl
t cl cl y x t
t t
y t t g g x

 

      . (2.16) 
Equation (2.16) requires that yg
 be nonsingular along the post-fault trajectories. 
Otherwise, the inverse of yg
 results in infinite sensitivity, a special case when sensitivity 
based estimation is not applicable [11].  
Equations (2.8) and (2.9), along with their augmentation (2.12) and (2.13), give 
the solutions of post-fault trajectories and their trajectory sensitivities with respect to 
fault clearing time. An efficient calculation of trajectory sensitivities shown in [11, 57] is 
used: if an implicit method such as trapezoidal rule is used for integration of DAEs (2.8) 
and (2.9), and a Newton method is used to solve the nonlinear equations in each 
integration step [58], the Jacobian matrix factorization calculated in the solving process 
can be directly reused for solving the trajectory sensitivity equations (2.12) and (2.13). 
Since Jacobian matrix factorization is the most time-consuming part in the DAE solution 
[59], the additional computational effort of solving for the sensitivity equations is 
minimized.  
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2.2.3 TVD Assessment 
A. TVD Dynamic Performance Criteria and Dynamic Security Region 
Calculation of V-CCT requires dynamic performance criteria to determine the 
TVD dynamic security region. Commonly used criteria consider both low voltage and 
high voltage limits during the oscillations and the time duration when a limit is violated, 
i.e., violation duration, as shown in Figure 2.5. The criteria are used to evaluate the post-
fault transient voltage trajectories and define the boundary of TVD dynamic security 
region. System performance subject to various disturbances can then be classified as 
acceptable or unacceptable in terms of TVD [60, 61]. Unacceptable cases need special 
attention to enhance the system dynamic security. 
The criteria defined by NERC/WECC are used, stated as follows [48]:  
 N-1 contingencies: Not to exceed 25% at load buses or 30% at non-load buses. 
Not to exceed 20% for more than 20 cycles at load buses. 
 N-k (k ≥ 2) contingencies: Not to exceed 30% at any bus. Not to exceed 20% for 
more than 40 cycles at load buses. 
Both N-1 contingencies and N-k ( 2)k    contingencies are considered in the 
NERC/WECC criteria. Transient voltages exceeding the defined magnitudes are treated 
as violations, as shown in Figure 2.5. The violation regions include both voltage over-
shooting region and voltage dip region. The violation duration is defined as the total time 
that a trajectory is out of the secure region. NERC/WECC criteria allow a few cycles of 
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short periods exceeding certain voltage levels; this violation allowance is not included in 
the violation duration. 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Illustration of TVD dynamic performance criteria 
 
B. Introduction to V-CCT 
Calculating V-CCT needs base-case post-fault transient voltage trajectories 
( , )baseclv t t  and their trajectory sensitivities with respect to fault clearing time / clv t  . 
Given the base-case fault clearing time baseclt , V-CCT is found by solving an optimization 
problem to determine the maximum fault clearing time deviation MAX( )clt  such that if 
the fault is cleared after MAX( )clt , the resulting post-fault voltage 
trajectories ( , )basecl clv t t t   just touch the limit of TVD dynamic security region, which is 
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defined by TVD dynamic performance criteria, as introduced in section 2.2.3-A. This 
optimization problem is formulated as 
 Max 
clt   (2.17) 
 ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )base base basecl cl cl cl cl cl
cl
v
v t t t v t t v t t v t t t
t

       

  (2.18) 
 ( , )basecl clv t t t V     (2.19) 
where V stands for TVD dynamic security region.  
In (2.18), within a typical range of clt , ( , )
base
cl clv t t t  is getting worse with 
increasing clt . The formulated optimization problem is a single-variable convex 
problem, which can be solved using local search methods such as hill climbing [62] and 
golden section [63]. After obtaining MAX( )clt , V-CCT is calculated as 
 V-CCT MAX( )basecl clt t     (2.20) 
C. Procedures of the Proposed TVD Assessment Method 
The procedure of TVD assessment using V-CCT is as follows: 
Step 1: Select contingencies for TVD assessment. 
Step 2: For contingency i, base-case time-domain simulation is performed, and voltage 
trajectory sensitivities with respect to fault clearing time are calculated. 
Step 3: For contingency i, V-CCT is computed from (2.17)-(2.19) based on the base-
case simulation and corresponding trajectory sensitivities obtained from step 2. 
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Step 4: i = i + 1 and repeat step 2-3, until completing all contingencies, and then go to 
step 5. 
Step 5: Rank the severity of all contingencies based on their V-CCT. 
In the procedure described above, base-case time-domain simulation performed 
for each contingency will consume most of the analysis time. The effort of trajectory 
sensitivity calculation and the V-CCT computing process is negligible compared with 
time-domain simulation. 
2.2.4 Estimation Error Index 
Because power systems are nonlinear, using trajectory sensitivities to calculate 
V-CCT will cause estimation error, the degree of which depends on the magnitude of 
MAX(Δtcl) and the system nonlinearity characteristics around 
base
clt . Detailed estimation 
error analysis can be found in [56, 64]. In case of unacceptable estimation error, 
reference [64] presented two strategies: second order trajectory sensitivities and 
switching operating states method, to reduce the estimation error. In [64], the test of the 
proposed two strategies to improve the estimation accuracy in case of large change in 
fault clearing time shows satisfactory results. To quantify the estimation performance, an 
estimation error index (EEI) is formulated as 
 
2
12
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
EEI
N
k
v k v k
v k v k
N N



   
 

  (2.21) 
where 
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v’(∙) Estimated trajectory at estimated V-CCT 
v*(∙)  Real trajectory at V-CCT through trial-and-error simulations 
N Total points of a trajectory 
k k-th value along all the N points of a trajectory 
2
  2-Norm operator 
The norm of trajectory difference is further normalized by the total number of 
value points (N) of a trajectory.   
 EEI evaluates voltage trajectory estimation of a single bus.  For a power system, 
among the EEI for all buses, the largest one is selected as the metric to quantify the 
estimation error. If a bus is tripped, its voltage is not considered. 
EEI is used to evaluate the accuracy of V-CCT, but establishing this accuracy should 
be done off-line, because calculating v*(∙) requires trial-and-error simulations. 
2.2.5 Case Studies 
Three systems are used to evaluate the performance of the proposed assessment 
method: a 9-bus system [65], the New England 39-bus system [66] and a large 13000-
bus system.  
A. 9-Bus System 
The one-line diagram of 9-bus system is shown in Figure 2.6.  
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Figure 2.6 One-line diagram of 9-bus system 
 
The base-case contingencies are described in Table 2.1, all with fault clearing 
time 0.04s. It is assumed that a fault occur only at terminal of a transformer or one end 
of a transmission line. In the last column of Table 2.1, ‘F’ is followed by the number of 
bus closest to the faulted transmission line or transformer, and ‘O’ followed by outaged 
transmission line(s) or transformer(s) { , }i jb b  connecting bus i and bus j. Table 2.1 
shows the estimated V-CCT based on trajectory sensitivities, actual V-CCT obtained 
from trial-and-error simulations, EEI and the rank. The rank r1 is based on estimated V-
CCT, and r2 based on actual V-CCT.  
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Table 2.1 Voltage assessment results on the 9-bus system 
# 
Est. / Act. 
V-CCT 
EEI (e-4) 
Rank 
r1 / r2 
Contingency 
Description 
1 0.131 / 0.149 9.561 11 / 11 F-7; O-{7,8} 
2 0.013 / 0.013 7.924 2 / 2 F-6; O-{6,9} 
3 0.174 / 0.189 10.562 13 / 13 F-9; O-{8,9} 
4 0.055 / 0.057 8.587 10 / 10 F-7; O-{5,7} 
5 0.133 / 0.150 9.562 12 / 12 F-9; O-{6,9} 
6 0.025 / 0.025 6.687 3 / 3 F-5; O-{5,7}-{4,5} 
7 0.036 / 0.034 5.739 7 / 7 F-6; O-{4,6} 
8 0.011 / 0.012 8.130 1 / 1 F-8; O-{8,9}-{7,8} 
9 0.033 / 0.033 5.846 6 / 6 F-7; O-{5,7}-{4,5} 
10 0.025 / 0.026 6.243 4 / 4 F-9; O-{6,9}-{3,4} 
11 0.031 / 0.030 5.963 5 / 5 F-8; O-{8,9} 
12 0.052 / 0.055 6.541 9 / 9 F-5; O-{5,7} 
13 0.042 / 0.046 5.653 8 / 8 F-7; O-{8,9}-{7,8} 
 
Though the estimated V-CCT deviate from the actual V-CCT to some degree, the 
rank r1 and r2 are consistent. To further validate the analysis results in Table 2.1. Figure 
2.7 compares the worst-case bus voltage in the rank 1 contingency CON #8 and the 
worst-case bus voltage in the rank 2 contingency CON #2.  
 CON #8 is a three-phase fault on the bus 8 end of transmission line from bus 7 to 
bus 8. The fault is cleared by tripping the faulted line and also inadvertent 
tripping of an adjacent bus 8.  
 CON #2 is a three-phase fault that is applied on the bus 6 end of transmission 
line from bus 6 to bus 9. The faulted transmission line is cleared successfully 
after the fault. 
CON #8 is an N-k ( 2k   ) inadvertent tripping contingency. The worst-case bus 
is bus 5, which is a load bus. CON #2 is an N-1 contingency and the worst-case bus is 
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bus 6, which is also a load bus. For comparison, the two contingencies have identical 
fault clearing time, which is 5 cycles, i.e., 0.083s. The worst-case bus voltage trajectories 
are compared in Figure 2.7, which indicates CON #8 is worse than CON #2, in 
accordance with the analysis result in Table 2.1. 
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Figure 2.7 Voltage comparison of two contingencies 
 
Table 2.1 indicates that the estimated V-CCT are close to the actual V-CCT. To 
further analyze the estimation error, Figure 2.8 shows the relation between EEI and 
MAX(∆tcl).  
In Figure 2.8, the MAX(Δtcl) are evenly distributed along the horizontal axis. 
Because of system nonlinearity, the estimation error increases with the absolute value of 
30% dip for CON 
#8 
20% dip for CON 
#8 
20% dip for CON 
#2 
36 cycles 
40 cycles 
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MAX(Δtcl), denoted as [MAX( )]clabs t . 
From Figure 2.8, given fixed base
clt , large [MAX( )]clabs t  is one reason of large 
EEI, because the nonlinearity is worse when V-CCT deviates more from base
clt . Based on 
this feature, one strategy to reduce the effect caused by estimation error is to set the 
base
clt to a small value, to make it closer to V-CCT of more severe contingencies. Though 
larger EEI indicates worse estimation accuracy, the V-CCT is also larger, which 
suggests that corresponding contingencies are more secure and thus do not need further 
attention.   
 
Figure 2.8 Comparison of EEI for different V-CCT deviations 
 
CON #3 has the largest EEI. Compared with the actual V-CCT 0.189s, its 
estimated V-CCT is 0.174s, with EEI = 10.5621e-4. CON #3 is an example to observe 
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the estimation accuracy and relate the EEI value with direct observation of trajectories. 
CON #3 consists of a three-phase fault at the bus 9 end of the line from bus 8 to bus 9, 
cleared by tripping the faulted line. The worst-case bus is bus 6. The voltages at bus 6 
obtained through (a) simulation at actual V-CCT, (b) estimation using (2.20) at 
estimated V-CCT, and (c) simulation at base-case clearing time ( 0.04baset s ) are shown 
in Figure 2.9. Although this is for the case with the largest EEI, the estimation is still 
acceptable.  
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Figure 2.9 Estimation performance test on the 9-bus system 
B. New England 39-Bus System 
Test on the New England 39-bus system further confirms the analysis on the 9-
bus system. The one-line diagram of the 39-bus system is in Figure 2.10. The analysis 
results are in Table 2.2. 
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Figure 2.10 One-line diagram of New England 39-bus system 
 
Table 2.2 Voltage assessment results on the New England 39-bus system 
# 
Est. / Act. 
V-CCT 
EEI (e-4) 
Rank 
r1 / r2 
Contingency 
Description 
1 0.630 / 0.667 6.734 25 / 25 F-2; O-{2,30} 
2 0.864 / 0.872 7.384 26 / 26 F-10; O-{10,32} 
3 0.192 / 0.200 4.094 7 / 9 F-19; O-{19,33} 
4 0.403 / 0.412 5.925 19 / 19 F-20; O-{20,34} 
5 0.255 / 0.259 4.924 11 / 11 F-22; O-{22,35} 
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Table 2.2 continued 
6 0.542 / 0.554 6.674 24 / 24 F-23; O-{23,24} 
7 0.509 / 0.519 6.637 23 / 23 F-25; O-{25,37} 
8 1.092 / 1.214 7.375 27 / 27 F-10; O-{10,13} 
9 0.456 / 0.461 5.837 21 / 21 F-39; O-{1,39}-{9,39} 
10 0.193 / 0.199 4.109 8 / 8 F-17; O-{16,17}-{17,27} 
11 0.330 / 0.290 5.826 15 / 14 F-18; O-{3,18}-{17,18} 
12 0.249 / 0.245 4.937 10 / 10 F-27; O-{17,27}-{26,27} 
13 0.336 / 0.331 5.803 17 / 17 F-3; O-{3,4} 
14 0.266 / 0.262 4.962 12 / 12 F-13; O-{10,13}-{13,14} 
15 0.154 / 0.156 3.836 4 / 4 F-16; O-{16,19} 
16 0.031 / 0.032 2.984 2 / 2 F-29; O-{26,29} 
17 0.184 / 0.186 3.869 5 / 6 F-24; O-{16,24} 
18 0.335 / 0.330 5.884 16 / 16 F-4; O-{4,5}-{4,14} 
19 0.282 0.279 4.951 13 / 13 F-13; O-{10,13} 
20 0.194 / 0.196 4.213 9 / 7 F-17; O-{16,17}-{17,27} 
21 0.102 / 0.104 3.926 3 / 3 F-16; O-{16,19}-{16,21} 
22 0.455 / 0.460 5.837 20 / 20 F-1; O-{1,39} 
23 0.368 0.361 5.826 18 / 18 F-6; O-{4,5}-{4,14} 
24 0.508 / 0.516 6.443 22 / 22 F-8; O-{7,8} 
25 0.329 / 0.326 5.826 14 / 15 F-18; O-{3,18} 
26 0.187 / 0.185 3.907 6 / 5 F-16; O-{15,16}-{16,17} 
27 0.020 / 0.021 2.987 1 / 1 F-24; O-{16,24}-{23,24} 
 
 
From Table 2.2, the estimated V-CCT are close to actual V-CCT. The rank r1 
and r2 are consistent for most contingencies. Inconsistency occurs when a group of 
contingencies has very close actual V-CCT. This does not affect the analysis because 
this group of contingencies have almost the same severity, thus should receive equal 
attention of the operators. The relationship between EEI(e-4) and V-CCT deviation is 
setup for the 39-bus system in Figure 2.11, which also shows the increase of EEI with 
abs[MAX(Δtcl)], as in Figure 2.8. Strict increase does not occur, because V-C CT is for 
the worst-case bus and the worst-case bus differs for different contingencies. 
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Figure 2.11 Comparison of EEI for differenct V-CCT deviations 
 
Two contingencies are selected for comparison. The fault clearing time is 5 
cycles for both contingencies. Since the worst contingency CON #27 involves very fast 
voltage collapse immediately after the fault is cleared, the rank 2 contingency CON #16 
and rank 3 contingency CON #21 are analyzed, and the voltage trajectories of all buses 
are shown in Figure 2.12.  
 CON #16 is a three-phase fault on the bus 29 end of transmission line from bus 
26 to bus 29, cleared by tripping the faulted line.  
 CON #21 is a three-phase fault on the bus 16 end of the transmission line from 
bus 16 to bus 19, followed by tripping that line and also inadvertent tripping of 
an adjacent transmission line bus from 16 to bus 21. This is an N-2 contingency.  
Figure 2.12 shows that, CON #16 results in voltage collapse after about 1s; 
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whereas CON #21 is not so severe. 
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Figure 2.12 Voltage comparison of two contingencies for the New England 39-bus 
system 
 
To test the computational efficiency of the analysis, the proposed assessment 
method has been implemented on a MATLAB based time-domain simulator PSAT [67]. 
PSAT has built-in trapezoidal method with Newton method for integration. The 
generator 4
th
 order model is used for simulation [59]. The trajectory sensitivity is 
calculated using the method in [11]. The modified PSAT performs (a) time-domain 
simulation, (b) trajectory sensitivity calculation and (c) solving (2.17)-(2.19) to calculate 
V-CCT for the two benchmark systems. 
Voltage 
Collapse 
Stable Case 
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The simulation has been conducted in Windows environment, with an Intel Core 
2 Duo CPU (2.10Hz) and 4.00 GB RAM. Figure 2.13 shows the average analysis time of 
single contingency for the test cases.   
 
 
Figure 2.13 Time consumption for TVD assessment (in seconds) 
 
From Figure 2.13, V-CCT calculation costs negligible time compared with the 
whole analysis process. Since the augmented DAEs  (2.3) and (2.4) are linear equations, 
the solution can be obtained through one iteration of Newton method at each time step, 
and the involved Jacobian matrix factorization can be obtained while solving the original 
DAEs (2.1) and (2.2). With the size increase of the test systems, the portion of iteration 
and matrix factorization in the whole simulation process has also increased, which 
provides more time saving in calculating trajectory sensitivities, as observed in Figure 
2.13.   
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C. 13000-Bus System 
The 13000-bus system has 430 generators, 13402 buses and 12488 branches. The 
total generation is 4.8 GW. PSS/E is used to simulate this large system. All generators 
are represented with GENROU machine model, IEEET1 exciter model and TGOV1 
governor model [68]. Since it is difficult to list the results for all credible contingencies, 
only 10 contingencies within the same zone are selected. Six of the contingencies are 
three-phase faults on generator terminals followed by tripping the faulted generators. 
The rest contingencies are three-phase faults on transmission lines (138kV~500kV) 
followed by tripping the faulted lines.  
The trajectory sensitivities are approximated based on the method introduced in 
[14], i.e., 
 
0
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( ) lim cl cl cl cl
cl
v t t v t t v t t v t tv
t
t 
 
 
   
 

  (2.22) 
where ( 0)  is an infinitesimal increment. The analysis results are shown in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 Voltage assessment results on 13000-bus system 
# 
Est. / Act. 
V-CCT 
Rank 
r1 / r2 
Remarks (tripped elements) 
1 0.165 / 0.161 2 / 2 Gen. (137.1 MW; 305.4 MVar) 
2 0.193 / 0.200 5 / 5 Gen. (62.0 MW; 120.5 MVar) 
3 0.197 / 0.201 6 / 6 Gen. (33.7 MW; 98.5 MVar) 
4 0.165 / 0.171 3 / 3 Gen. (116.9 MW; 203.5 MVar) 
5 0.176 / 0.179 4 / 4 Gen. (63.5 MW; 139.5 MVar) 
6 0.139 / 0.135 1 / 1 Gen. (293.9 MW; 349.2 MVar) 
7 0.315 / 0.320 10 / 10 Line (44.6 MW; 0.2 MVar) 
8 0.260 / 0.270 8 / 8 Line (104.1 MW; 92.6 MVar) 
9 0.216 / 0.219 7 / 7 Line (380.7 MW; 381.9 MVar) 
10 0.269 / 0.277 9 / 9 Line (88.4 MW; 13.9 MVar) 
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Table 2.3 shows the estimated and actual V-CCT, and the corresponding ranking. 
The estimated V-CCT are close to actual V-CCT. Rank r1 and r2 are consistent. For 
generator tripping contingencies, the tripped generation is listed in the remarks column 
of the table. For the transmission line tripping contingencies, the power transfer on the 
lines is listed in the remarks column. 
Table 2.3 indicates that the V-CCT of generator tripping contingencies are 
relatively smaller than V-CCT of the transmission line tripping contingencies. The 
severity of TVD is associated with the generation of the tripped generators. For 
transmission line tripping contingencies, taking out a line with more power transfer 
results in lower V-CCT and therefore higher severity in TVD.  
2.2.6 Conclusions 
A new index, i.e., V-CCT, for power system TVD quantitative assessment has 
been presented. V-CCT applies the concept of CCT to TVD assessment. It indicates the 
severity of fault-initiated contingencies based on TVD dynamic performance criteria. 
Obtaining V-CCT is computational efficient, due to the use of trajectory sensitivities to 
estimate V-CCT.  
The proposed index has been tested on a 9-bus system, the New England 39-bus 
system and a 13000-bus system. Computational efficiency has also been analyzed to 
show that trajectory sensitivity calculation and V-CCT calculation consume much less 
time compared with the time used for base-case time-domain simulation. Ranking the 
contingencies provides a priority list for further actions to prevent the potential 
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unacceptable voltage quality.  
2.3 Accuracy Refinement of Estimation using Trajectory Sensitivity 
2.3.1 Motivation and Contributions 
One useful function of trajectory sensitivities is to estimate the trajectory 
deviations after slight change of parameters. That is, given base-case system variable 
trajectories, their deviations after a small amount of parameter change can be estimated 
using trajectory sensitivities. The parameters include system parameters and initial 
conditions. Examples of system variables are bus voltages and rotor angles. Examples of 
system parameters are generation levels and transmission line impedances. Trajectory 
sensitivities are linear sensitivities of nonlinear power systems, thus cannot avoid 
estimation error, the degree of which depends on the nonlinearity characteristics along 
the nominal trajectories and the magnitude of the parameter change. Two strategies are 
presented to reduce the estimation error: second order trajectory sensitivities (SOTS) and 
switching operating states (SOS) method. SOTS improve the estimation accuracy using 
higher order sensitivity information that partially considers the system nonlinearity. The 
fast calculation of SOTS is also presented when implicit integrator and the Newton 
iteration are used. SOS method reduces the estimation error caused by the system 
nonlinearity through partitioning the total parameter change into several levels and 
calculating the trajectory sensitivities along each level. Then the trajectory deviation is 
the sum of the deviations estimated at all levels. 
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2.3.2 Estimation Accuracy Refinement Strategies 
A. SOTS 
Reference [69] identified governor parameters using SOTS. SOTS were 
mentioned in [18] but not applied. The advantage of SOTS is further illustrated in case 
of tcl change, and also introduces how to efficiently calculate SOTS. In trajectory 
sensitivity based estimation, higher order terms are neglected for estimation, leaving 
only the linear trajectory sensitivities. Taking a further step to get the second order 
terms, the estimation becomes  
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Figure 2.14 Illustration of SOTS 
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Figure 2.14 shows the advantage of SOTS. After the λ change Δλ, the actual 
consequential change of z is Δz1.  Due to the nonlinearity, sensitivity (slope) evaluation 
at point A leads the estimation to Δz3, which deviates much from Δz1. The SOTS 
evaluation at point A considers parts of the system nonlinearity; the resulting estimation 
Δz2 is a much closer value. 
To calculate SOTS, taking derivative of (2.3) and (2.4) with respect to λ yields 
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The integration using trapezoidal rule to solve (2.1) and (2.2) is 
 1 1 1( , ) ( , )
2
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         (2.26) 
 1 10 ( , )k kg x y    (2.27) 
where k is time index and η is integration time step. Writing (2.26) and (2.27) in matrix 
form to get 
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where   = [xk+1, yk+1]. The Newton iteration solve F( ) = 0 as 
 11 ( ) ( )i i i iF F   

     (2.29) 
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where is F( ) Jacobian matrix of F with respect to  , i.e.  
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To solve for [x2λ, y2λ] from (2.24) and (2.25), trapezoidal integration rule is used 
as 
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Rearranging gives 
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Expression of P1(∙) and P2(∙) can be obtained through manipulation of (2.31) and 
(2.33). Note that, besides the SOTS information [x2λ, y2λ] to calculate, (2.31) and (2.33)
include 
1) System variables [x, y] at step k and k+1  
2) Trajectory sensitivities [xλ, yλ] at step k and k+1  
3) Other function evaluations 
All the information above is available for calculating SOTS because (19) at step 
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k+1 is solved after obtaining x, y and corresponding linear trajectory sensitivities of this 
step [11]. Also note that, solving (2.33) can directly borrow the Jacobian matrix 
factorization from (2.30), thus greatly decreases the calculation time, because matrix 
factorization is the most time-consuming part in solving DAEs. In this way, time for 
calculating SOTS is minimized. 
B. SOS Method  
Principle of SOS method: Given a parameter change Δλ, this change is divided 
into n ≥ 1 sub-changes Δλi that result in several operating levels. Then the trajectory 
sensitivities tsi (i ≤ n) along each level of the sub-changes are calculated. The impact of 
the parameter change Δz on the system is the sum of the impact due to all sub-changes, 
i.e., 
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SOS method is also illustrated in Figure 2.15. It is the same case as in Figure 
2.14 that the trajectory sensitivity at point A leads to large deviation of estimation from 
the real value. SOS method divides Δλ into 3 sub-changes, and evaluates the sensitivity 
for each sub-change. The estimation based on SOS method is Δz2, a much closer value to 
Δz1. 
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Figure 2.15 Illustration of SOS Method 
2.3.3 Case Studies 
The New England 39-bus system is used to test the presented SOTS and SOS 
method. The system data and one-line diagram can be found from [66].  
A. Voltage Trajectory Sensitivity to Contingency Clearing Time 
At 0.1s, a three-phase fault occurs at a transmission line. The fault is cleared by 
tripping the faulted line. The transient voltage at the worst-case bus is evaluated. In the 
base-case simulation, the fault during time Δtcl is 0.01s, i.e., the fault is cleared at 0.11s. 
The designed experiment tests the estimation accuracy when the fault during time 
increases to 0.04s.  
The worst-case bus voltage trajectories with tcl = 0.04s are obtained from (a) 
time-domain simulation, (b) estimation using only linear trajectory sensitivity and (c) 
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estimation using also SOTS, respectively. Figure 2.16 compares those post-contingency 
trajectories. It can be observed that the estimated trajectory using SOTS tracks the 
simulation result much better than the estimation using only linear trajectory sensitivity.  
 
Figure 2.16 Worst-case bus voltage comparison for SOTS 
To test the SOS method, the fault duration time Δtcl =0.03s within [0.11s, 0.14s] 
is divided into two parts. The same worst-case bus voltage trajectory sensitivities with 
respect to tcl are calculated at 0.11s and 0.13s. Figure 2.17 shows the advantage of using 
SOS method for estimation. It is observed in Figure 2.17 that the estimation using SOS 
method is better compared with the estimation using only the trajectory sensitivity 
obtained at 0.11s.  
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Figure 2.17 Worst-case bus voltage comparison for SOS method 
B. Frequency Trajectory Sensitivity to Load 
This experiment tests the estimation accuracy of the frequency trajectory 
sensitivity to load. The importance of the proposed accuracy refinement methods is 
illustrated through a case in which trajectory sensitivity based under-frequency load 
shedding is implemented for generator-turbine protection.  
The trajectory sensitivity analysis is not limited to particular load model. The key 
issue is to incorporate the control into the load model. A frequency dependent load 
model is used for the experiment [70]. The control is through regulating the coefficient α 
(0 ≤ α ≤ 1) in the model, i.e., 
  
0
(1 ) 1
100
P
Pp
k V
P
V


 
 
    
 
  (2.35) 
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Figure 2.18 Frequency of generator 39 
A similar model can be used for Q. In the base-case simulation, generator 31 is 
tripped at 0.2s. If there is no further remedial action, the frequency of generator 39 drops 
to 57.7 Hz, which is below the pre-set frequency limit 58 Hz, such that generator 39 
shall be tripped for protection. To prevent the unnecessary tripping that worsens the 
situation, under-frequency load shedding is designed by formulating optimization 
problem, similar to [35, 71], to regulate the post-contingency frequency response using 
trajectory sensitivities of generator frequencies to coefficient α of load at bus 39.  
Solving for the optimization problem yields the amount of load to shed to maintain the 
frequency of generator 39 above 58 Hz, on estimation basis. When the calculated α = 8% 
is applied in the time-domain simulation, the load shedding failed to lift the generator 
frequency back to a more secure level. 
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 The next step is to use both SOTS and SOS method in the optimization problem. 
The obtained α = 14% is applied in the time-domain simulation. From Figure 2.18, the 
generator frequency reaches the expected value.  
C. Analysis of Test Results 
There are several comments regarding these two strategies: 
1) These two strategies are not constrained to trajectory sensitivities with respect to 
only contingency clearing time or load parameter. They are also applicable to 
other parameters such as generation levels, loads and transmission line 
impedances. 
2) SOTS do not require too much extra computing time, whereas SOS method 
needs to consider the balance between estimation accuracy and computational 
efficiency. 
3) SOTS and SOS method can be used either separately or together, depending on 
the degree of nonlinearity. 
4) Trajectory sensitivities are linear sensitivities. Some features unique for linear 
systems, such as homogeneity and additivity [72], are applicable. The proposed 
two strategies deal with nonlinearity and present satisfactory improvement when 
single parameter change involves. In case there is change of multiple parameters, 
applications of the two strategies need more caution.  
2.3.4 Conclusions 
To improve the estimation accuracy based on trajectory sensitivities, two 
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strategies: SOTS and SOS method are presented. The obtaining process of SOTS is 
provided and its calculation efficiency is proved. The two strategies have been tested on 
the New England 39-bus system, to estimate the post-contingency transient voltages 
after the change of contingency clearing time and load parameter. The testing results 
indicate that the two strategies can improve estimation accuracy.  
Future work includes testing the computational efficiency of SOTS and 
inspection of situational criteria to apply the two accuracy refinement strategies.  
2.4 Discussion 
Contingency analysis is an important function of DSAPS. The dissertation uses 
trajectory sensitivity analysis to extract more system security information compared with 
performing base-case time-domain simulations only. Trajectory sensitivities estimate 
trajectory variation with parameter change, and thus they can speed up analysis. The 
estimation function of trajectory sensitivities can be used to determine operation limits, 
e.g., V-CCT. As introduced in section 2.1.2, the application of trajectory sensitivity is 
not constrained to the work in this dissertation. Numerous other areas remain to be fully 
explored. 
Equation Chapter (Next) Section 1 
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3. CHAPTER 3: ANTICIPATORY COMPUTING 
SYSTEM FOR CASCADING DEFENSE 
3.1 Motivation 
Power systems are designed based on N-1 criteria to withstand disturbances 
causing loss of a major system component, such as transmission line, generator and 
transformer. However, large blackouts still occur [73], which usually involves low-
probability, high-consequence cascading outages. An event in a cascading outage could 
be an N-1 or N-k ( 2k  ) contingency. The uncertainties that radiate from the initiating 
events of cascading outages makes the analysis even more complicated [74]. Special 
protection systems (SPS), also known as remedial action schemes (RAS), are used 
worldwide to detect system abnormal conditions and determine remedial actions to apply 
after the initiating events [75-78] to preserve system integrity and provide acceptable 
system performance. This paper presents an automated SPS design framework, named 
anticipatory computing system (ACS), to defend against cascading outages that could 
result in catastrophic system failures. 
NERC report [79] has provided an SPS classification. It specifies the requirements for 
SPS design and implementation. Unlike preventive actions taken for high-probability 
events such as those specified under NERC categories B and C [80], remedial actions are 
taken for low-probability events such as category D events. That is, they are required to 
apply after an event, thus will not bring extra operational cost in normal conditions. In 
addition, remedial actions should be effective and optimal, to successfully mitigate the 
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system stress in an economical way. In the following, the existing SPS applications in 
the U.S. power industry are reviewed, which guide the design in this Chapter. 
MISO: MISO has developed real-time contingency analysis (RTCA) tool that 
includes most SPS they have designed, except a few very complicated ones. MISO sends 
the statuses of SPS through inter control center protocol (ICCP) point to the control 
room personnel, who take the decision from real-time information displayed [81], [82]. 
The RTCA tool is either scheduled to run at uniform intervals or triggered based on a 
contingency event or by an operator.  
CAISO: In CAISO, RAS are written using database language (DBL) to 
manipulate tables in the EMS environment [83]. The user-written RAS DBL scripts are 
simulated in contingency analysis in study mode, and validated by operations engineers. 
The contingencies are then copied to the real-time mode and the corresponding RAS are 
activated. The designed SPS are reviewed and updated whenever the electric grid 
experiences changes. 
ERCOT: In ERCOT, SPS are protective relay systems to take corrective actions 
after detecting abnormal system conditions, in order to provide acceptable system 
performance [84]. ERCOT SPS are grouped into two types: ‘Type 1 SPS” and “Type 2 
SPS”, focusing on wide-area impact and local-area impact, respectively.  
BC Hydro: In BC Hydro, centralized SPS are armed automatically by a transient 
stability assessment function centrally within EMS at the control center [85], [86]. The 
arming is done either every four minutes or immediately after a network change. Each 
SPS acts as the interface between inputs (contingencies) and the outputs, which are 
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corresponding control actions, including generator shedding, line tripping and shunt 
switching, in order to improve transient, voltage or thermal stability.  
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA): BPA uses programmable logic 
controller for its SPS design. The SPS in BPA consist of line status monitoring, control 
logic and SPS arming/action [87], [88].  Most SPS are on 500KV lines. BPA SPS are 
designed to be highly redundant using two out of three voting schemes. The information 
is sent to two control rooms to improve redundancy. There are limits on generation 
tripping of 2700MW [89] in order to avoid frequency problems. BPA also coordinate 
with northern and central California such that the SPS can keep up system integrity in 
Pacific Northwest and California [90].   
Southern California Edison (SCE): Having many isolated localized RAS leading 
to coordination problems, SCE is introducing wide-area centralized RAS (CRAS) to 
reduce operational complexity [91], [92]. Compared to localized RAS, CRAS can 
increase system-wide reliability, speed up generation interconnection and save labor for 
RAS maintenance.  
Review of SPS practice in the U.S. industry shows that SPS design is developing 
toward centralized wide-area schemes, which benefit from the fast communication and 
computing technology development. Real-time wide-area monitoring [93], [94] and fast 
time-domain simulation [95] improve online dynamic security assessment, which once 
was a formidable topic in SPS design. One the other hand, we are also facing challenges 
of SPS design to defend against cascading outages.  
One challenge of SPS design for cascading defense is to identify and assess the 
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sequence of events in a cascading outage, because the uncertainties unfold after the 
initiating event of a cascading outage, resulting in formidable computational burden. 
There has been significant amount of work on cascading outage analysis. Some 
commonly used cascading models are discussed in [96], including OPA [97], 
CASCADE [98] and hidden failure [99]. There are also commercial and research-grade 
software tools available [78]. In [100], dynamic event tree is used for cascading 
representation.  
Another challenge is to design effective, optimal and coordinated corrective 
controls to mitigate the system stress and prevent unnecessary component tripping after 
the initiating events. Existing SPS practice designs corrective controls off-line for 
identified cascading outages; corrective controls, e.g., dispatch or load shedding, are 
determined based on experience [101]. With large quantity of cascading outages to 
analyze, a generalized decision-making tool is needed to automate SPS design for 
various security problems. In addition, backup plan is needed in case of emergencies 
when an unexpected high-consequence event occurs. 
To address the two challenges, a framework, called ACS, is proposed to 
automated SPS design for cascading defense. There are two main contributions related to 
this framework, as described below. 
ACS Design: We generalize the progression of historical cascading outages for 
ACS design, which extends the work in [100]. The idea of ACS comes from other 
industries (e.g., airline [102], nuclear [103] and process control [104]) where the control 
operators employ computational capability that help predict system response and 
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identify corrective actions. The philosophy of ACS is to predict system response after 
low-probability, high-consequence events and prepare SPS that are scheduled to apply 
after an event occurs, in order to relieve the system stress and prevent unnecessary 
component tripping, and consequently prevent cascading outages. ACS automates the 
whole SPS application process for cascading defense, including cascading sequence 
identification, violation detection, SPS design and application. This automated process is 
centralized, reducing the complexity in SPS maintenance and coordination. The two 
working modes of ACS address the computational burden in off-line cascading analysis 
and the emergencies (e.g., unexpected events that include mis-operation and failure to 
take actions as designed) in online operation. ACS is also a useful decision-making tool 
that provides guidance to protection engineers for SPS design. 
Design of Dynamic Corrective Action Tool (DCAT): We design DCAT that 
determines corrective controls with pre-set protection rules to address system 
performance violation. A corrective security constrained optimal power flow (SCSOPF)  
within DCAT determines more than real power dispatch to guarantee control optimality 
through solving large-scale linear programing problems. Solutions of CSCOPF are 
implemented in real time to mitigate the post-event impact on the system. 
 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 lists the historical 
major blackouts and summarizes the features of the historical events. Section 0 explains 
the two modes of ACS: online mode and emergency mode, and their computational 
requirements. Section 3.4 introduces DCAT design and violation detection logic. Section 
IV provides the optimization formulation of CSCOPF. The case studies on a benchmark 
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are discussed in section 3.5, using two cascading outage sequences to test the control 
performance. Conclusions are stated in section 3.6. 
3.2 Features of Historical Events 
The major blackouts that have occurred since 1965 have been reviewed. Table 3.1 
lists the number of notable major blackouts around the world [1]. The definition of 
“notable” means 
 The blackout must not be planned by the service provider 
 The blackout must affect at least 1000 people and last at least one hour 
 There must be at least 1 million (person × customer hours) of disruption 
Table 3.1 shows that, the number of major blackouts increases each year since 
1965. 
Table 3.1 Number of notable major blackouts around the world since 1965 
Year 
1965-1995 
(30 years) 
1996-2000 
(5 years) 
2001-2005 
(5 years) 
2006-2010 
(5 years) 
2011-2013 
(3 years) 
Number of Major 
Blackouts 
13 16 27 77 30 
 
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 summarize the 30 most severe blackouts that have 
occurred since 1965. These tables update the information in [105, 106]. 
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Table 3.2 Summary of extreme major blackouts since 1965 
Location Date 
GW 
lost 
Duration 
People 
affected 
Approximate 
cost 
US-NE 11/09/1965 20 13 hours 30 million  
US-NE 07/13/1977 6 22 hours 3 million 300 million 
France 12/19/1978 30 10 hours   
West Coast 12/22/1978 12.35  5 million  
Sweden 12/22/1982 >7 5.5 hours 4.5 million  
Brazil 12/27/1983 15.762    
Brazil 08/18/1985 7.793    
Hydro Quebec 04/18/1988 18.5    
US-West 01/17/1994 7.5    
Brazil 12/13/1994 8.63    
US-West 12/14/1994 9.336  1.5 million  
Brazil 03/26/1996 5.746    
US-West 07/02/1996 11.743  1.5 million  
US-West 07/03/1996 1.2  
small 
number 
 
US-West 08/10/1996 30.489  7.5 million 1 billion dollars 
San Francisco 12/08/1998 1.2 8 hours 1 million  
Brazil 03/11/1999 25 4 hours 75 million  
Brazil 05/06/1999 2    
India 01/01/2001 12 13 hours 220 million 107 million 
Rome 06/26/2003 2.15  7.3 million  
US-NE 08/14/2003 62 1-2days 50 million 4-6 billion 
Denmark/Sweden 09/13/2003 6300 6.5 hours 5 million  
Italy 09/28/2003 27 
19.5 
hours 
57 million  
Croatia 12/01/2003 1.27   2.5 million 
Greece 07/12/2004 9 3 hours 5 million  
Moscow/Russia 
05/24-
25/2005 
2.5 > 6 hours 4 million  
Java/Bali 08/18/2005 2.7  100 million  
China 7/1/2006 3.8    
European  11/04/2006 6.4 1 hour 15 million  
Brazil/Paraguay 11/10/2009 1.4 4.5 hours 87 million  
India 07/30/2012 36 15 hours 300 million  
India 07/31/2012 48 ≈ 1day 600 million  
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Table 3.3 Analysis of extreme major blackouts since 1965 
Location Date 
Number 
of outaged 
elements 
Time between 
initiating and 
secondary, 
pre-collapse 
events 
Cause of secondary, 
pre-collapse 
Events 
US-NE 11/09/1965 N-1 Few minutes 
 Proper protection 
operation 
US-NE 07/13/1977 N-2 20-45 minutes Lightening 
France 12/19/1978  > 30 minutes 
Proper protection 
operation 
West Coast 12/22/1978 N-1 Fast 
Primary and secondary 
protection & 
communication failure 
Sweden 12/22/1982 N-2 50 seconds 
Proper protection, 
under frequency LS 
failure 
Brazil 12/27/1983 N-1 9-10 minutes 
Simultaneous tripping 
of 7 circuits and 
transformers  
Brazil 08/18/1985 N-2  
Protection failure (SPS 
setting) 
Hydro Quebec 04/18/1988 N-3 2-3 seconds 
Communication failure 
followed by load 
shedding protection 
failure 
US-West 01/17/1994 N-2 Fast 
Proper protection 
operation 
Brazil 12/13/1994 N-1  
Proper protection 
operation 
US-West 12/14/1994 N-1 40-52 seconds 
Inefficient protection, 
loss of synchronism 
Brazil 03/26/1996 N-1  
Proper protection 
operation 
US-West 07/02/1996 N-1 20 seconds 
Proper protection 
operation, relay 
misoperation 
US-West 07/03/1996 N-1 Fast Relay misoperation 
US-West 08/10/1996 N-1 5-7 minutes Protection failure 
San Francisco 12/08/1998  16 seconds 
No load protection, 
delayed remote 
protection 
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Table 3.3 continued 
Brazil 03/11/1999 > N-6 > 30 seconds 
Proper protection 
operation 
Brazil 05/06/1999 Many  
Inadvertent protection 
operation 
India 01/01/2001  13 hours  
Rome 06/26/2003   
High load, low 
generation reduction in 
import 
US-NE 08/14/2003 N-1 
More than 2 
hours 
Proper protection 
operation 
Denmark/Sweden 09/13/2003 N-1 5 minutes 
Switching device 
breaks, proper 
protection operation 
Italy 09/28/2003 N-1 25 minutes 
Unsuccessful 
reclosing, loss of 
synchronism, dynamic 
interaction leading to 
voltage collapse 
Croatia 12/01/2003 N-1 30 seconds Protection failure 
Greece 07/12/2004 N-1 10 minutes 
Proper protection 
operation 
Moscow/Russia 
05/24-
25/2005 
 > 12 hours 
6 lines from HV 
substation tripped due 
to faults and 
overloading 
Java/Bali 08/18/2005    
China 7/1/2006 N-1  Inadvertent tripping 
European  11/04/2006 Many 30 minutes 
Proper protection 
operation 
Brazil/Paraguay 11/10/2009   87 million 
India 07/30/2012 N-1 3-4 hours 
Line tripping due to 
large angular 
separation 
India 07/31/2012 N-1 5 hours 
Line tripping due to 
overload 
 
The following observations are based on Table 3.3. 
 There are more notable major blackouts around the world: since 1965, 4 of 6 
blackouts that lost over 25 GW occurred in the 21st century; 6 of 7 blackouts 
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affecting more than 50 million people occurred in the 21st century (the remaining 
one occurred in 1999). 
 Initiating events can be N-1 contingencies or N-k (k ≥ 2) contingencies. N-k 
contingencies are usually line or bus faults followed by nearby protection 
failures.  
 About 50% of the blackouts were fast; taking several seconds to collapse after 
the initial event occurred. The remaining 50% of the blackouts involved slow 
processes that took several minutes to several hours to collapse after the initial 
event occurred. 
 If the blackout was one of the 50% characterized as “slow,” it involved cascading 
outages where transmission circuits and generators were tripped one after another 
which finally led to collapse due to the weakened system topology.   
The slow cascading outages reveal similar features in the event progression 
[107]: 
Stage 1: Before the initiating event, the system is usually in an extremely 
stressed condition, with heavy load and loss of components due to failures or scheduled 
maintenance. 
Stage 2: Initiating event occurs. It could be N-1 contingency or N-k (k ≥ 2) 
contingency. The system is weakened after the initiating event. 
Stage 3: The system becomes more stressed due to increasing load and tripping 
overloaded components with large time intervals. This slow progression may involve 
61 
 
 
several minutes to hours. 
Stage 4: The system condition gradually worsens and reaches its critical point of 
losing stability. Severe low frequency and low voltages could be observed. A single 
disturbance triggers the tripping of many components in several seconds, which in the 
end lead to system-wide disastrous failure. 
An important attribute of the progression described above is the large intervals 
between events in stage 3, which leave enough time for corrective control design and 
application. An event occurs almost depending on previous outages that gradually 
worsens the system situation and finally leads to high consequences in stage 4. The 
philosophy of ACS is to analytically predict the system response in stage 1-3 and design 
corrective controls in advance to avoid unnecessary outages in stage 3 and thus avoid 
system failures of stage 4. ACS is based on both real-time monitoring and high-speed 
extended-term time-domain simulation. ACS analyzes massive high consequence N-1 
and N-k (k ≥ 2) contingencies in identified cascading outages under day-ahead 
forecasted operating conditions, such that the optimal controls could be available for 
application once an analyzed scenario occurs in real time. In addition, ACS extends the 
work in [100] to consider uncertainties in real-time operation. That is, in situations when 
the real-time scenario is not considered before, ACS will utilize high-speed extended-
term time-domain simulation with current operating condition to predict short-term 
system response, designing corrective controls and applied applying them before a 
violation occurs. 
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3.3 Overview of ACS Design 
3.3.1 ACS Mode Description 
Based on prediction horizon, ACS has two working modes, i.e., online mode and 
emergency mode. The two modes collaborate and share computing facilities.  
1) ACS in Online Mode 
ACS in online mode relies on anticipatory analysis, which is an off-line analysis 
process. Anticipatory analysis prepares corrective controls for the next day. With 
identified initiating events and day-ahead forecasting information, including load, 
generation, network configuration, protection logic and settings, anticipatory analysis 
identifies system performance violations through extended-term time-domain 
simulation. For a detected violation, corresponding corrective control is designed and 
applied, and the event is re-simulated with the control application and repeated until the 
system is maintained secure temporarily, which is an hour-horizon in our case. A voltage 
related example is used to illustrate the anticipatory analysis in Figure 3.1 where two 
corrective controls successfully prevent voltage collapse. All analyzed scenarios with 
designed controls are stored in dynamic database. In real-time operation, ACS closely 
monitors the system in online mode. Once a high consequence event is detected, ACS 
retrieves from its dynamic database the scenario that matches the current situation, and 
then applies corresponding corrective control as designed. 
2) ACS in Emergency Mode 
It is impossible that ACS is prepared for all situations. To enrich dynamic 
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database, the contingencies to analyze can also come from historical events and 
operational experience. If ACS cannot find a suitable match from the dynamic database, 
the emergency mode is triggered to simulate the current event under the current 
operating condition.  
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Violation
System secured 
temporarily
Violation
Day-ahead information: load, 
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Figure 3.1 Anticiaptory analysis for ACS online mode 
 
The emergency mode is illustrated using a voltage example as in Figure 3.2.  
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Figure 3.2 ACS in emergency mode 
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The critical time points in Figure 3.2 are explained as follows: 
t0: initiating event occurs and ACS starts computing. 
tC: current time. 
tA: corrective control is applied. 
tS: ACS simulation stops for control design due to violation. 
 
The following procedure describes how ACS performs its functionality in emergence 
mode. 
 Step 1: Before an initiating event occurs, ACS closely monitors the power 
system.  
 Step 2: Once an initiating event occurs at t0 and the online mode fails to find the 
match in dynamic database for the current situation, the emergency mode is immediately 
triggered to start extended-term time-domain simulation. The initial configuration is 
obtained from SCADA system. In addition, ACS forecasts the operating condition for 
the next several minutes. ACS is faster than real time; it identifies a system violation that 
will occur at tS. Then corrective action is designed and scheduled to be applied at tA, 
while the current time is tC (tC < tA). The simulation time interval between t0 and the next 
tS that follows is called an anticipatory interval (AI). 
 Step 3: ACS restarts a new AI simulation from tS, with current state information 
from SCADA system as well as operating condition prediction information obtained at 
tS.  Steps 2-3 are repeated with new t0 replacing the old tS until the system is secured.  
 In addition, ACS will switch from online mode to emergency mode if the 
designed SPS does not operate as expected (e.g., hardware/software failure) or system 
behavior is different from what was predicted in anticipatory analysis. 
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3.3.2 Computational Requirements 
Both the online mode and emergency mode are computationally intensive. A 
cascading outage could involve both fast transients within several seconds and slow 
dynamics within several minutes. An extended-term time-domain simulator is necessary 
to address transitions in simulation time scales. The online mode requires fast scenario 
analysis to construct a rich dynamic database in a limited time. The emergency mode 
requires faster-than-real-time simulation ability for an unfolding scenario. The ability to 
simulate faster than real time depends on the size of the system model. If the simulator is 
constrained by software or hardware computing ability, the system model could be 
reduced to achieve faster-than-real-time simulation.  
 To test the simulation speed for the emergency mode, a simulation-real-time-
ratio (SRTR) index for each AI is developed as 
 0
0
CPU time
100%
Inpected real time
S
C
t t
SRTR
t t

  

 (3.1) 
where CPU time includes both simulation and control determination. Smaller SRTR 
indicates faster simulation and more time allowed for control design. For successful 
implementation of emergency mode, SRTR < 1 is required. 
3.4 Automation of Cascading Outage Analysis 
3.4.1 Cascading Outage Representation 
We need a structure that well represents the uncertainties following an initiating 
event under the forecasted operating condition, such that ACS in online mode can easily 
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locate, in the dynamic database, the analysis results that can be used in real-time 
operation. Inspired by the event tree [108], a tool that considers multiple dependent 
events, we also use a tree-structure. The simple tree in Figure 3.3 (a) represents the 
analysis of a cascading outage in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2. Many initiating 
contingencies that begin under the same forecasted operating condition form a large tree 
as in Figure 3.3 (b). Branches in the tree represent events, including initiating events, 
successive events and corrective controls, with corresponding system behaviors. The 
events are not necessarily discrete changes; a continuously changing process (such as a 
load increase within a period) that results in a new state is also considered an event. The 
corrective control can properly applies, mis-operate or even fail to initiate. The nodes in 
the tree indicate system states, including secure states, alarm states and violation states. 
If the system is in an alarm state, corrective action is needed to prevent the system 
transitioning into a violation state. 
Using this tree-structure, cascading analysis results are indexed by operating 
conditions. For decision-making in online mode, ACS only needs to search a single tree 
as in Figure 3.3 (b) that is characterized by operating conditions similar to the current 
ones.  It is observed that, an AI in Figure 3.2 corresponds to an interval between secure 
states in Figure 3.3.  
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Figure 3.3 The tree-structure to represent vent sequences in cascading defense 
3.4.2 Initiating Contingency Identification and Operating Condition Selection for 
Anticipatory Analysis 
In anticipatory analysis for the online mode, ACS identifies initiating high-risk 
events of cascading outages based on system topology processing, as introduced in 
[109]. ACS also identifies high-probability N-k contingencies due to protection mis-
operation and stuck breakers that result in loss of two or more components.  
An operating condition is defined by both discrete variables (such as component 
on/off status) and continuous variables (such as load level and generation profile). A 
corrective control designed under a particular operating condition to mitigate a cascading 
sequence is also effective under similar operating conditions. Thus, ACS lumps small 
changes of continuous variables into a discrete operating condition, which corresponds 
to a state in the tree structure. For example, Figure 3.4 shows a 24-hour load forecast 
discretized into intervals of equal load variation.   
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Figure 3.4 Discretized 24-hour load curve 
 
3.4.3 Violation Detection and Processing Logic 
ACS predicts system performance violations through evaluating time-variant 
trajectories from simulations, which are initialized by: (1) day ahead forecasting in 
online mode and (2) real-time measurements in emergency mode. The violations to 
detect in ACS include circuit overload, under/over-voltage and out-of-step conditions.   
For voltage and thermal limits, a performance violation is affirmed when system 
response exceeds the specified limits in simulation. In case of out-of-step condition, it is 
important to find the single generator or a group of generators that lose synchronism 
with the rest of the system. Since rotor angle trajectories are available for analysis, a data 
clustering technique is used for trajectory grouping. Suppose matrix R is a set of GN  rotor 
angle trajectories, i.e., 
1 2[ , , , , , ]Gi NR R R R R  
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where
iR is a column vector with discrete data points representing rotor angle response of 
generator i. In K-means clustering [110], each trajectory
iR is a location in a high-
dimensional space. All the locations are categorized into two groups to maximize the 
distance between groups and minimize the distance within the group. The group with 
fewer locations indicates unsynchronized generators. The clustering for out-of-step 
condition is illustrated in Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5 K-means clustering for synchronism identification 
 
3.4.4 Initiating Contingency Identification and Operating Condition Selection for 
Anticipatory Analysis 
The DCAT in ACS automates corrective control design and application after 
detection of violations.  
Table 3.4 shows violations that can be addressed by DCAT at present, and 
corresponding corrective control actions [111] that have been implemented.  
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Table 3.4 Possible corrective actions for each type of performance violation 
Violations Possible corrective controls 
Circuit overload Dispatch, load shedding 
Under/Over-voltage 
Shunt capacitor, generator voltage set points, 
load shedding 
Out-of-step condition Generator tripping, system separation 
 
CSCOPF is an important part within DCAT. Dispatch, load shedding and 
generator voltage set points are determined in CSCOPF based on linear programming. 
CSCOPF addresses circuit overload, under-voltage and over-voltage problems that need 
actions of generators and loads. The formulation of CSCOPF is 
 minimize  
1 1 1
G G LN N N
up up down down
overload g g g g g g l l
g g l
f c P v V v V c SL
  
            (3.2) 
subject to: 
 Power flow equations: 
 , {1,.., }inji dc BSP B i N    (3.3) 
 Power injection balance: 
 inj base basei i i i iP P L P SL         (3.4) 
 Branch flow equations: 
 BRP D A      (3.5) 
 Bus voltage approximation:  
  
1 1
G LN N
base up downi i
i i g g l
g lg l
V V
V V V V SL
V SL 
 
       
 
    (3.6) 
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 Branch flow limits: 
 max max, , , , {1, , }BR j BR j BR j BRP P P j N      (3.7) 
 Generation limits: 
 max maxmax{ , } min{ , }ramp rampg g g g gP r t P P r t
           (3.8) 
 Bus voltage limits:  
 min maxi i iV V V    (3.9) 
 Generation voltage setting upper limits:  
 ,max0 up upg gV V      (3.10) 
 Generation voltage setting lower limits: 
 ,max0 down downg gV V      (3.11) 
 Load shedding limits: 
 max0 i iSL SL      (3.12) 
 NG is the total number of generators; NBS is the total number of buses; NBR is the 
total number of branches; ΔPi is the decision variable: generation change; ΔSLl is the 
decision variable: load shedding; injiP  is the power injection; Bdc is the NBS  NBS B-
matrix for DC power flow, obtained by replacing each diagonal element of the busB  (the 
susceptance part in  admittance bus) with sum of the non-diagonal elements in the same 
row, and multiply all off-diagonals by ‘-1’ [112]; D is the NBR NBR diagonal matrix with 
negative branch susceptance; A is the NBR  (NBR-1) node-arc incidence matrix that 
indicates sending bus with ‘1’ and ending bus with ‘-1’ for each branch corresponding to 
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a row; θ is the vector of bus voltages; base
iP  is the base-case generation; 
base
iL is the base-
case load; Δt is the  maximum time allowed for generator full reaction; rampgr
 is the 
ramping up/down rates; maxgP
 is the generation limits due to capacity; max
iSL is the load 
shedding limit. 
It is assumed that the base-case generator setting is optimal such that any change 
will cause extra cost. /up downgV  is the decision variable: generator voltage setting 
regulation up/down; baseiV is the base-case bus voltage; 
min
iV is the bus voltage 
limit; /i gV V   is sensitivity of bus voltage to generator voltage setting point; /i lV SL   
is sensitivity of bus voltage to load shedding; ,min/maxupgV is lower/upper limit of 
generator voltage setting. The bus voltage sensitivities to a voltage set point are obtained 
through two runs of AC power flow: one for base-case, the other with infinitesimal 
increment of voltage set point 
g  p.u. ( 0 1g ) of generator g. Then the sensitivity of 
bus i voltage to voltage set point of generator g is approximated as 
 
0
lim
g
inc base inc base
i i i i i
g g g
V V V V V
V   
  
 

.  (3.13) 
The sensitivity of bus i voltage to load l ( /i lV SL  ) is obtained using the same way. 
The priority of controls considered within an objective function in CSCOPF is 
cost oriented. That is, the cost coefficients upgc ,
up
gv and lc are determined to consider 
economic issues and reflect control priority. Compared with load shedding, dispatch and 
voltage setting are more economical if effective. Load shedding has been used as the last 
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remedial action to prevent blackout because it is fast and effective but also cause most 
negative impact. This priority is reflected as 
 /, up downg l g lc c v c  . (3.14) 
3.5 Case Studies 
A 40-machine, 140-bus system that represents a simplified Northeast Power 
Coordinating Council (NPCC) system is used for case studies.  The one-line diagram of 
the test system is shown in Figure 3.6 [113]. The system data can be found in [114]. A 
MATLAB program has been developed to test the designed ACS.  
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Figure 3.6 One-ling diagram of NPCC 140-bus system 
 
For online mode, ACS generates a list of initiating events that has 3196 
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contingencies for cascading analysis. Of all the identified contingencies, 532 are N-1 
contingencies that trip components that malfunction due to faults; 1054 are stuck-breaker 
contingencies that result in additional tripping of another component connecting to the 
faulted component; 1610 are inadvertent tripping contingencies that trip additional lines 
adjacent to the faulted lines. 
ACS simulates load increase for 1 hour after the initiating contingencies, based 
on the day-ahead forecasting information. If a system performance violation is detected, 
the most economical corrective actions are determined by DCAT to mitigate the system 
stress and prevent unnecessary outages.  
The control performance of ACS is tested with two cascading outages. Cascading 
outage A is used to test anticipatory analysis in online mode; cascading outage B is used 
to test emergency mode. The dynamic components in the system include generators, 
governors and exciters. 
3.5.1 Cascading Outage A 
The 4th-order generator model is used in this case. The cascading progression is 
described as follows.  
Progression from S1 to S3: A three-phase fault occurs on the bus 135 end of line 
133-135. The fault clearing is delayed, which causes out-of-step condition. The 
generator on bus 135 loses its synchronism with the rest of the whole system. Figure 
3.7(a2) shows the generator frequency response in out-of-step condition. ACS trips the 
unsynchronized generator, which was generating 5.2% of the total generation. Figure 3.7 
(a1) shows the frequency response with generator tripping.  
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Progression from S3 to S5: The system load increases by 10% within 2000s. 
Area 6 displays overload on some lines, as shown in Figure 3.7 (b2), where the y-axis 
shows the capacity percentage of all lines. This is caused by the large quantity of load in 
area 6. Line 127-132 is the heaviest loaded line. The solution of SCSOPF suggests that 
the generation on bus 132 and 133 is decreased, and the decreased generation is picked 
up by other generators. Figure 3.7 (b1) shows the comparison of line 127-132 flows 
before and after the dispatch obtained from CSCOPF. 
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Figure 3.7 Anticipatory analysis for cascading outage A 
 
Progression from S5 to S7: The system load continues to increases by 5% within 
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1000s. Area 6 becomes more stressed, as shown in Figure 3.7 (c2). Due to the 
constraints on generator ramp-up/down rates and the requirement of fast response that 
results in very small ∆t, CSCOPF suggests that load shedding is first initiated to release 
the system stress, as shown in Figure 3.7 (c2). 
 
3.5.2 Cascading Outage B 
Cascading outage B begins under a different operating condition. ACS works in 
emergency mode in this case. Generator classical model is used to speed up the 
simulation. The simulation is conducted in 64-bit Windows 7 environment with Intel 
Core 2 CPU (2.21 Hz) and 4 GB RAM. The cascading progression is described as 
follows.  
Progression from S1 to S3: A three-phase fault occurs on the bus 91 end of line 
91-98. The fault is cleared by tripping line 91-98, and advertent tripping of an adjacent 
line 91-92. Severe power swing in the faulted area causes out-of-step condition. The 
generator on bus 98 loses its synchronism with the rest of the system. Figure 3.8 (a2) 
shows the generator frequency response in out-of-step condition. Then DCAT trips the 
unsynchronized generator, which was generating 2% of the total generation. Figure 3.8 
(a1) shows the frequency response with generator tripping. SRTR does not apply to this 
scenario.  
Progression from S3 to S5: The system experiences load increase by 2% in area 
2 and 1% in the rest of the system. The load increase results in unacceptable voltage 
drop, as shown in Figure 3.8 (b2). Shunt capacitor adjustment is first initiated on bus 
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111, which is responsible for regulating voltage in area 2.  The adjustment is based on 
pre-set control rules. The voltage trajectory after the adjustment is shown in Figure 3.8 
(b1). SRTR is 21.3%. That is, even if the violation is captured at the end of the 2000s-
simulation, ACS is still able to apply effective control at 42.6s. In this case, the control is 
applied at 90s. 
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Figure 3.8 Emergency mode for cascading outage B 
 
Progression from S5 to S7: The load continues to increase 20% in area 2 and 7% 
in the rest of the system, within 1000s. Area 2 is even more heavily loaded. Voltage 
collapse is detected by ACS. Figure 3.8 (c2) shows the area 2 bus voltages. CSCOPF is 
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formulated and solved to lift the voltage levels. It is found that the bus voltage 
sensitivities to voltage set points place limited impact on lifting the bus voltages in this 
situation. The result indicates corresponding generator set points adjustment and load 
shedding on bus 111. Figure 3.8 (c1) shows the area 2 bus voltages with designed 
corrective control. SRTR is 30.4%.  
3.6 Conclusions 
The proposed ACS is a framework of automated SPS design. Cascading events 
are anticipated and prepared for in advance to prevent large-scale blackouts. The two 
working modes of ACS are complementary to each other and provide enough 
redundancy of SPS to enhance system dynamic security. ACS also support protection 
engineers for their decision-making in cascading analysis and SPS design. 
The computing facility for extended-term time-domain simulation is significant 
to implement the proposed ACS. The computational complexity is affected by system 
size, component modeling requirement, number of cascading outages analyzed and 
length of cascading outages. It is never enough to improve state-of-the-art computing 
ability to enable analysis that is more detailed. The modeling details and computing 
speed should be balanced to ensure the success of the proposed scheme. 
Equation Chapter (Next) Section 1 
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4. CHAPTER 4: CONTROL DESIGN: A TWO-STAGE 
UNDER-FREQUENCY LOAD SHEDDING SCHEME 
4.1 Motivation 
Power systems experience under-frequency when load exceeds generation. In 
severe conditions, load control can contribute to balancing load and generation. 
Reference [115] summarized the historical severe under-frequency conditions in which 
load shedding is involved, including the 17644 MW load shedding in the U.S. Northeast 
blackout of 2003. This chapter designs a two-stage load control scheme for severe 
under-frequency conditions. The designed scheme consists of event-based under-
frequency load shedding (UFLS) in the first stage and model predictive control (MPC) 
using interruptible loads in the second stage. 
UFLS is a remedial action for high-consequence events that involve significant 
frequency decline. UFLS is the last automated measure to arrest frequency decline while 
preventing generator trip and subsequent blackouts [116]. NERC requires that each 
planning coordinator develop an UFLS program implemented by transmission owners 
and distribution providers [117]. A well-designed UFLS program needs to shed 
minimum loads in order to minimize the economic loss. Existing UFLS programs are 
considered to be “response-based” in that they respond to a measured system condition, 
in this case, frequency. For example, if the frequency at a location drops below 59.3 Hz 
for 0.3 seconds, there will be 10% load shedding with 0.1 seconds time delay [118]. 
UFLS programs monitor local system frequency response after the disturbances and 
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incorporate controls to react to actual system conditions [119], [120]. The relay settings 
have several scales of frequency thresholds and intentional time delay, to shed certain 
amounts of load according to local measurements of frequency levels (f) and possibly 
frequency change rates (df/dt). The relay settings are designed based on operational 
experience and are fixed for all scenarios. Response-based strategies such as UFLS are 
used when gradual increase of remedial action is acceptable, but they may not be fast 
enough to prevent instability following severe disturbances causing large and rapid 
frequency excursions [121].    
 Modern power grids have witnessed two recent changes that motivate interest in 
new forms of frequency control. One change is the increased penetration of renewable 
energy, most of which is not contributing to automatic generation control (AGC). 
Reference [122] discussed the future scenarios in California with increased penetration 
of renewable energy and the corresponding decrease in conventional generation. Less 
conventional generation leads to diminished capability of providing timely generation 
control. In case of severe under-frequencies conditions and when conventional 
generation is close to their capacity due to lack of renewable generation (for such as 
weather reasons), AGC may reach the limit thus cannot even provide sufficient 
generation control. The other change is that demand-side controllable resources have 
become more prevalent. Loads are already participating in the regulation market for real-
time frequency regulation [123]. In [124], it was demonstrated how to include loads, 
especially air-conditioning loads, as spinning reserve for load curtailment during large 
contingencies. Similar demand-side resources suitable for frequency regulation are 
81 
 
 
refrigerators, water heaters and various other household appliances that are generally 
available when needed. Such loads exist in the form of small and independent units that 
can be controlled in a reliable, robust and relatively continuous way. A controller was 
developed in [125] to attach to appliances in response to under-frequency in heavily 
loaded conditions. Reference [126] also suggested a hierarchical structure in which 
substation level controllers coordinate the interruptible loads under them, making 
possible continuous load control.  
In this chapter, interruptible loads are controlled to supplement AGC. This is 
attractive for three reasons. First, load control can respond to frequency deviations very 
quickly, much faster than generation that requires mechanical movement of a valve or a 
water gate. Once a load curtailment decision is made and transmitted to the local 
controller, the local controller can drop the loads instantaneously by opening the breaker 
that connects the loads. Second, load control is available at many locations throughout 
the grid, in contrast to generation, which is usually concentrated locationally. Third, 
some types of loads, particularly heating and cooling loads, have service quality that is 
almost insensitive to their use for control, in contrast to renewables which are often 
unwilling to control away from maximum energy extraction. For example, based on 
contracted agreement with customers, Southern California Edison curtailed air-
conditioning loads 37 times with duration of 5-20 minutes, and received no complaint 
[124]. 
The proposed load control scheme coordinates wide-area loads for optimal 
control. It has two stages. The event-based UFLS (EB-UFLS) in the first stage is driven 
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by high-consequence events, such as large power plant tripping or controlled islanding. 
It is event-based in that it reacts immediately to pre-identified events. Event-based 
strategies have been widely used for remedial action design to obtain very fast action in 
order to maintain system integrity with minimum time delay [83, 127-131]. Anticipated 
high-consequence events that can cause severe under-frequency are analyzed before they 
occur. The corresponding remedial actions, i.e., feeder disconnection decisions, are 
obtained by solving mixed integer programming (MIP) problems that is called load 
shedding optimization (LSO). System dynamics in LSO are approximated with linear 
constraints based on trajectory sensitivity analysis. The designed remedial actions form a 
lookup table for online decision-making. In real time, the EB-UFLS program directly 
takes the remedial action according to the lookup table once an analyzed event is 
detected, to maintain system stability and protect turbine-generators. 
The open-loop nature of the event-based control may result in over-shedding. 
This is addressed by biasing downwards the EB-UFLS and then actuating MPC in the 
second stage for closed-loop control of interruptible loads to supplement AGC. 
In the second stage, MPC uses optimization to design controls at every control 
step, providing a faster alternative to AGC for frequency regulation. MPC is closed-
loop; it repetitively optimizes the control outputs to regulate system dynamic behaviors 
with real-time measurements and an internal system dynamic model. In this design, 
MPC determines control signals at each control step by solving a linear programming 
(LP) problem, which is called model predictive optimization (MPO) that coordinates 
wide-area interruptible load resources. In this way, MPC recovers the system frequency 
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to the rated frequency (60 Hz), coordinating with existing AGC in its control process. 
MPC has been widely explored in power system real-time control and proven to be an 
attractive control strategy, not only for load control [126], but also for  AGC [132] and 
reactive power control [133], [38]. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces trajectory sensitivity 
analysis and formulates LSO for EB-UFLS. Section 4.3 introduces MPC and formulates 
MPO for MPC-based load control. Section 4.4 provides the overall design of the 
proposed load control scheme. Section 4.5 provides the results of case studies on two 
test systems. Concluding remarks are provided in section 4.6. 
4.2 LSO for EB-UFLS 
This section provides the LSO formulation for EB-UFLS using trajectory 
sensitivities to approximate system dynamics when parameters change. 
4.2.1 Introduction to Trajectory Sensitivity Analysis 
Consider power system dynamics described by differential algebraic equations 
(DAE) [11] 
 ( , , )x f x y u   (4.1) 
 0 ( , , )g x y u   (4.2) 
where x are state variables, such as rotor angles and speeds; y are algebraic variables, 
such as voltages and power; u are control variables, such as loads. The discrete events 
are modeled by switching between different sets of DAE. To obtain the trajectory 
84 
 
 
sensitivities of system variables x and y with respect to parameter u, taking derivatives of 
(4.1)-(4.2) with respect to u yields 
 u x u y u ux f x f y f      (4.3) 
 0 x u y u ug x g y g     (4.4) 
Equations (4.3)-(4.4) are called augmentations of the original DAE. They 
generate two new sets of unknown variables: 
  u
x
x
u



 and u
y
y
u



. (4.5) 
The efficient calculation of the original DAE along with their augmentations is 
described in [11]. This chapter uses a simple procedure to approximate the trajectory 
sensitivities as [14]  
 
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
limu
u
x u u x u x u u x u
x
u u 
     
 
 
 (4.6) 
which involves simulation of the system model for parameter u and u+∆u where ∆u is 
infinitesimal increment of u. yu can be obtained using the same method. Trajectory 
sensitivity linearizes the system along a nominal trajectory, rather than around an 
equilibrium point. Reference [64] summarized the wide applications of trajectory 
sensitivity analysis in the power system area. One useful function of trajectory 
sensitivity is to approximate the trajectory deviations after a slight change of parameters. 
Given base-case time-domain simulation trajectories x
b
(t), y
b
(t) and parameter change 
Δu, according to Taylor series expansion, the system variable trajectories are 
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approximated by ignoring higher order terms, according to 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )b b ux t x t x t x t x t u        (4.7) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )b b uy t y t y t y t y t u        (4.8) 
Equations (4.7)-(4.8) are used in this chapter to design the proposed two-stage 
load control scheme. 
4.2.2 LSO Formulation 
LSO determines optimal load shedding solutions for each contingency to satisfy 
system performance criteria. Performance requirements for frequency dynamics are 
imposed within the LSO constraints. The LSO formulation is as follows: 
 minimize  
1
L
l l
l
CP SL

   (4.9) 
Subject to:  
 Frequency dynamics approximation: 
 ,( ) ( ) ( ) /n n base n l lf k f k f k SL SL      (4.10) 
 ,st ,base_st ,st /n n n l lf f f SL SL      (4.11) 
 Under-frequency time limits: 
 , , ,( ) / ( ) ( ) / 1n d n n d n d nf f k M u k f f k M             (4.12) 
 , ,0 ( 1) ( 1)n d n dr k B u k       (4.13) 
 , , ,0 ( 1) ( 1) [1 ( 1)]n d n d n dT k r k B u k          (4.14) 
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 , , ,( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)n d n d n dT k r k u k t k       (4.15) 
 , , ,max delay( )n d n dT k T T    (4.16) 
 Reference frequency constraints:  
 , ,err ,st , ,errn ref n n n ref nf f f f f       (4.17) 
 Load shedding constraints: 
 ,max0 l lSL SL   (4.18) 
where k ∈ {1,…,Kn} is the index of values that represent discretized trajectory n; n ∈ 
{0,…,N} is the generator index where 0 is used to indicate the system frequency; d ∈ 
{0,…,D} is the time limit threshold index.  
The decision variable SLl in the objective function (4.9) is load shedding amount 
on load l. The coefficients CPl indicate the load importance based on cost; identical 
coefficients are used in this case to minimize the total amount of load to shed.  
UFLS involves dropping blocks of loads by disconnecting feeders. This 
discreteness creates modeling difficulties since feeder flows cannot be known exactly 
until real-time. Modeling load shedding amount as continuous variables SLl in LSO 
allows on-line decisions of selecting feeders to disconnect such that the total load 
shedding on a bus (substation) is closest to but more than the calculated optimal values 
that meet the minimum performance requirements. This over-shedding is considered by 
MPC-based load control in stage 2, using interruptible loads. 
In (4.10)-(4.11), which approximate frequency dynamics, the frequency response 
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of generator n is approximated using trajectory sensitivities according to (4.7)-(4.8). 
Variable fn,base(k) is the base-case frequency along which the trajectory sensitivities are 
calculated. The system frequency f0, which is used to evaluate the system response, is the 
center-of-inertia frequency, expressed in (4.19)  
 
 
1
0
1
( )
( )
N
n n
n
N
n
n
H f k
f k
H






  (4.19) 
where Hn is the inertia of generator n. The frequencies experience multiple swings of 
oscillation with decreased magnitudes before reaching their steady states. To save LSO’s 
computational burden, the trajectories to evaluate only include the early swings. Then 
the steady-state frequencies (4.11) are constrained in (4.17).  
The frequency dynamics are constrained in (4.12)-(4.16). The post-contingency 
frequency response cannot exceed the threshold fn,d for more than a certain time duration 
Δtd,max. Different frequency thresholds have different time limits, as indicated in Table 
4.1.  
Table 4.1 lists two sets of time limits in different columns. One set is “time limits 
for generators” that avoid undesirable generator trip, as considered in [116]. The other 
set is “time limits for system” that guarantee acceptable performance of system 
frequency f0. The system performance criteria used by Northeast Power Coordinating 
Council (NPCC) are used in the case studies [134].  
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Table 4.1 Under-frequency time limits 
Index (d) 
Frequency 
Limits (Hz) 
Time Limits 
for Generator 
Time Limits 
for System 
 Below 60.5 Safe Safe 
1 Below 59.5 3 min 30s 
2 Below 58.5 
30s 
10s 
3 Below 58.0 
0 
4 Below 57.8 7.5s 
5 Below 57.5 45 cycles 
6 Below 56.8 7.2 cycles 
7 Below 56.5 0 
 
To evaluate the duration, a set of binary variables ud,n (k) indicates if the 
frequency is below the threshold fn,d or not, as in (4.12).  The variable fn,d is frequency 
threshold d of generator n; M is a large positive value (M = 100 is used) such that 
 
, ( )
1
n d nf f k
M

 .  (4.20) 
Thus, un,d (k) = 0 if fn (k) > fn,d  and un,d (k) = 1  if  fn (k) < fn,d . Then Tn,d (k), duration 
below fn,d, is computed as 
 , , , ,( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)n d n d n d n dT k u k T k u k t k          (4.21) 
where Δt is integration time step. Once the frequency is higher than fn,d, Tn,d (k) is reset to 
zero. A special case is fn (k) = fn,d, when un,d (k) can be either 0 or 1, whichever 
minimizes the objective function. This case has been considered over-shedding.  
In order to avoid the nonlinearities in (4.21), the term un,d (k-1)∙Tn,d (k-1), is re-
defined as rn,d (k-1) to satisfy (4.13)-(4.14)where is chosen large enough B (B = 100 is 
used) such that 
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 , ,maxn dB T .  (4.22) 
where Tn,d,max ,which can be found in Table 4.1, is the time limit of threshold d for 
generator n .  This strategy was also deployed in [120] for setting UFLS relays. 
In this way, rn,d (k-1) is equivalent to un,d (k-1)∙Tn,d (k-1) because 
 
, ,
,
,
( 1) ( 1) 1
( 1)
0 ( 1) 0
n d n d
n d
n d
T k u k
r k
u k
  
  
 
  (4.23) 
After the linearization, (4.21) becomes (4.15). 
The steady-state frequencies should reach the reference frequency, within a 
tolerance, as in (4.18) where fn,ref is the reference, and fn,err is the tolerance. 
4.3 MPC-Based Load Control 
4.3.1 Introduction to MPC 
In MPC, a sequence of controls optimizes the predicted behavior of the 
monitored system variables [135]. This closed-loop control process is shown in Figure 
4.1.  
 
Figure 4.1 Closed-loop control process of MPC 
90 
 
 
MPC is conventionally implemented using linear system models. In this case, the 
system model is nonlinear, so the system dynamic behaviors are converted into linear 
constraints in MPO using trajectory sensitivities. MPC based on trajectory sensitivity has 
been implemented in the power systems area before [136]. 
An introduction to MPC for nonlinear systems and the standard optimization 
formulation can be found in [137], [138]. In the MPC optimization, TP is the prediction 
horizon, and TC is the control horizon. At time tk, MPC solves the optimal control 
problem over a finite predicted time horizon [tk, tk+TP], to design control output u for [tk, 
tk+TC] (where TC ≤ TP), according to the following: 
  minimize ( ( ), ( ), ( ))
k P
k
t T
t
F x y u d   

   (4.24) 
subject to: 
 ( ( ), ( ), ( )), ( ) ( )k kx f x y u x t x t      (4.25) 
 0 ( ( ), ( ), ( )), ( ) ( )k kg x y u y t y t      (4.26) 
 ( ) , [ , ]Cu t t T    U   (4.27) 
 ( ) ( ), [ , ]k C C Pu u t T t T t T         (4.28) 
 ( ) , ( ) , [ , ]k k Px y t t T      X Y   (4.29) 
The function F(∙) evaluates the control performance which in this case is the cost 
of load curtailments. The tildes (~) in the formulation indicate real-time measurements 
as opposed to internal model variables, where the difference between the two is a result 
of the inaccuracies in the model and/or the model parameters. The optimization is solved 
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for every sampling interval δ (δ ≤ TC) when real-time measurements are obtained and 
used in the formulation. The optimized control u are applied only for [tk, tk+δ], since 
updated control will be obtained from solving the next optimization problem at time tk+1 
= tk+δ, based on real-time measurements at that time, with tk+TC and tk+TP shifted 
forward to tk+1+TC and tk+1+TP. 
The on-line numerical solution of the nonlinear optimization of (4.24)-(4.29) can 
be computationally expensive for large-scale systems, since DAE are involved. 
Approximation using trajectory sensitivities reduces the computational burden by 
replacing (4.25)-(4.26) with (4.7)-(4.8). This approximation has also been deployed in 
MPC-based power system load control [36, 37, 139-141] and reactive power 
compensation for voltage stability [38], [37]. 
4.3.2 MPO Formulation for MPC-based Load Control 
After the frequencies have recovered from the large excursions in the first stage, 
MPC in the second stage neglects binary variables that count durations in LSO and 
formulates MPO into linear programing problems for online computing. The MPO 
formulation for MPC is 
 minimize  [ ] [ ]
1
L
h h
l l
l
CP SL

   (4.30) 
subject to: 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ],base( ) ( ) ( ) /
h h h h h
n n n l lf k f k f k SL SL       (4.31) 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
,st , _st ,st /
h h h h h
n n base n l lf f f SL SL       (4.32) 
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 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ], ,err ,st , ,err
h h h h h
n ref n n n ref nf f f f f        (4.33) 
 [ ] [ ] [ ],min ,max( )
h h h
n n nf f k f    (4.34) 
 [ ] [ ],max0
h h
l lSL SL    (4.35) 
where superscript [h] is the index of control steps. The cost-oriented coefficients [ ]h
lCP  
can be determined by real-time pricing, or incentives paid to participating customers 
[142]. Identical coefficients are used. The reference frequency [ ],
h
n reff does not stay the 
same throughout the control process; MPO uses a changing reference strategy whereby 
the reference frequency [ ],
h
n reff starts from the steady-state frequency before the 
initialization of MPC and increases by [ ],
h
n incf  at each MPC step until the reference 
frequency reaches 60 Hz. This changing-reference strategy, which is also employed in 
[136] for controlling shunt capacitors for voltage recovery, is implemented to avoid large 
load interruption at each control step. The magnitudes of frequency excursions after each 
load curtailment are constrained in (4.34). In this case, [ ],min
h
nf  and 
[ ]
,max
h
nf are determined 
such that [ ] ( )hnf k does not deviate from
[ ]
,
h
n reff by more than
[ 1] [ ]
, ,st( )
h h
n ref nf f
  . 
An example in Figure 4.2 illustrates the intended post-contingency frequency 
response under MPC. The controls are determined by solving (4.30)-(4.35). After the 
application of the designed control at tk, the real-time measurements differ from the 
predicted system response due to inaccuracies in the model and the model parameters. In 
the next control step at tk+1 = tk+δ, real-time measurements are used to initialize (4.31)-
(4.32), and this process is repeated until the control objective is achieved. The parameter 
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δ is chosen such that the frequency reaches a new steady state before occurrence of the 
next load curtailment.  Using the changing-reference strategy, each MPO predicts system 
dynamics for the next sampling interval δ, and the control (which is load curtailment) is 
also designed for the next sampling interval δ, thus, TP = TC = δ holds in this case for 
frequency regulation. 
 
Figure 4.2 MPC-based load control for frequency regulation 
 
4.4 Implementation of Two-stage Load Control 
Figure 4.3 shows the time frames of all controls for frequency regulation. The 
dotted lines indicate the effect of the scheme on original primary (governor) and 
secondary (AGC) control. In real-time operation, the designed EB-UFLS is applied 
immediately following the contingency detection. Governor response begins at the same 
time. MPC begins when the system reaches the steady state after EB-UFLS and 
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governor response. From Figure 4.3, EB-UFLS reduces the amount of governor action 
required, and MPC reduces the amount of AGC action required. Several factors 
determine the duration of MPC, including frequency reference and length of sampling 
interval δ [124],  [126].  
 
 
Figure 4.3 Frequency control time frames 
The flowchart to implement the proposed two-stage load control scheme is 
shown in Figure 4.4.  Off-line analysis solves LSO for identified contingencies under 
forecasted operating conditions if any time limit in Table 4.1  is violated. The designed 
controls form a lookup table that is stored in the dynamic database for online decision-
making. MPC is always implemented because the power imbalance still exists after the 
governor control. To further improve the computational efficiency for real-time 
operation, trajectory sensitivities needed for MPO-based MPC are calculated in off-line 
analysis.  
95 
 
 
 
According to 
Table 4.I
 Determine available 
loads, day ahead schedule 
and credible contingencies
Limit violated?
Calculate trajectory 
sensitivities for EUFLS
Time-domain simulation
Form & Solve LSO
Time-domain simulation 
with EB-UFLS
Next contingency?
Calculate trajectory 
sensitivities for MPO
End
Stage 1: EB-UFLS
Stage 2: MPC
Severe disturbance capture
Off-line analysis Real-time operation
EB-UFLS designed?
Real-time monitoring
 EB-UFLS solutions & trajectory 
sensitivities for MPO
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Information
storage
Lookup table
+
trajectory 
sensitivities
 
Figure 4.4 Flowchart of the two-stage load control scheme implementation  
4.5 Case Studies 
The goal of the case studies is to illustrate the performance of the proposed two-
stage load control scheme in terms of frequency recovery, governor response and AGC 
response. Two systems are used to test the proposed scheme: A 9-bus system and the 
New England 39-bus system. PSAT [67] performs time-domain simulation for the test 
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systems. The two systems utilize ZIP load models with frequency sensitivities [143].  
4.5.1 9-Bus System 
The one-line diagram of a 9-bus system, which has 6 generators, is shown in 
Figure 4.5. Two contingencies are analyzed; each is to trip one generator, as described in 
Table 4.2. 
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Figure 4.5 One-line diagram of 9-bus system 
Table 4.2 Contingency list for 9-bus system 
Contingency # Description Gen. % of System Gen. 
Contingency 1 Trip generator 5 16 MW 2.8% 
Contingency 2 Trip generator 6 22 MW 3.8% 
 
After tripping one generator at 0.2 seconds, due to the imbalance between the 
load and the generation, the system experiences sudden decline of generator speeds. The 
governors react to the contingency based on their droop characteristic [112], such that 
after the contingency, the frequencies recover to a level lower than the rated 60 Hz. 
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Figure 4.6 shows the system frequencies following the two contingencies. For 
contingency 1, all frequencies meet the performance requirements in, thus only MPC-
based load control is needed. For contingency 2, the steady-state frequencies are below 
59.5 Hz, which does not meet the performance requirements in Table 4.1, thus both 
stages are needed in load control. 
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Figure 4.6 Frequency responses after tripping generators. Plot (a) corresponds to 
generators frequencies after the two contingencies. Plot (b) corresponds to system 
frequencies in contingency 2 with and without EB-UFLS. 
 
EB-UFLS is designed for contingency 2. MPC is triggered for both contingencies 
1 and 2 after 15 seconds, at the end of the transient period. The MPC curtails the 
interruptible loads step by step. Using the changing reference strategy, the reference 
frequency [ ],
h
n reff starts from the steady-state frequency before the initialization of MPC and 
increases by [ ],
h
n incf  = 0.1Hz at each MPC step. When the frequencies reach over 59.5 Hz 
Contingency 1 
Contingency 2 
Contingency 2 
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but less than 60.0 Hz, [ ],
h
n incf is reduced to ensure
[ ]
,
h
n reff does not exceed 60 Hz. The 
sampling interval δ (which is 20 seconds in this case) is chosen to be large enough for 
transients to cease after each load curtailment. MPC remains in effect until the system 
frequency is recovered to 60 Hz.  
AGC signals are applied every 1s. The load control scheme is tested in two 
conditions. The first condition has sufficient reserve for AGC-based frequency 
regulation. The second condition assumes high penetration of renewable energy, when 
conventional generation is close to their capacity due to lack of renewable generation, as 
discussed in section 4.1, thus AGC reaches the limit before the frequency recovery. The 
AGC ramp rates are determined in accordance with NERC operating guide [144], which 
requires that the frequency is back to the rated value within 10 minutes in contingency 
conditions. Historical severe events have shown that frequency recovery could take more 
than 10 minutes, e.g., the WECC event on June 14, 2004 took 18 minutes to recover 
[145].  
In the simulation, to reflect the discreteness of load blocks in reality, as discussed 
in section 4.2.2, the EB-UFLS over-sheds by a random percentage within [0%, 5%] at 
each bus. To account for the time needed to detect, communicate, process, and decide, 
the action of EB-UFLS has 0.2-second delay after the contingency. For contingency 1, 
the load curtailments in MPC, with sufficient AGC and limited AGC, are shown in 
Table 4.3. For contingency 2, the EB-UFLS (including the over-shedding) and load 
curtailments in MPC, with sufficient AGC and limited AGC, are shown in Table 4.4.  
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Table 4.3 Load curtailments on 9-bus system for contingency 1 
Steps MPC-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 
Time (s) 15 35 55 75 95 
MW* 2.771 2.751 2.742 2.740 2.250 
MW** 2.770 2.749 2.743 2.752 2.320 
* Sufficient AGC; ** limited AGC 
Table 4.4 Load curtailments on 9-bus system for contingency 2 
Steps EB-UFLS MPC-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 
Time (s) 0.4 15 35 55 75 95 
MW* 2.048 3.795 3.775 3.726 3.725 1.35 
MW** 2.045 3.801 3.781 3.723 3.721 1.40 
* Sufficient AGC; ** limited AGC 
 
The system frequencies for the two contingencies are shown in Figure 4.7 and 
Figure 4.8.  
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Figure 4.7 System frequencies in contingency 1 
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Figure 4.8 System frequencies in contingency 2 
 
For comparison, Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 also show the effect of AGC without 
MPC. It is observed that, MPC recovers the system frequency to 60 Hz much faster than 
the situation with only AGC. In case of insufficient reserve, as in Figure 4.7 (b) and 
Figure 4.8 (b), AGC loses the capability of frequency regulation when it reaches the 
limit. 
4.5.2 New England 39-Bus System 
The one-line diagram of the New England 39-bus system is shown in Figure 4.9. 
The simulated contingency is to trip the generator on bus 31 at 0.2s. Before the 
contingency, the tripped generator was operating at 368.9 MW, 5.1% of the total 
generation. The frequencies of all generators without the proposed load control are 
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shown in Figure 4.10 (a), and the corresponding system frequency is shown in Figure 
4.10 (b). 
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Figure 4.9 One-line diagram of the New England 39-bus system 
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Figure 4.10 Frequency response comparison. Plot (a) corresponds to generator 
frequencies without load control. Plot (b) corresponds to comparison of system 
frequency with and without EB-UFLS. 
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From Figure 4.10, without load control the system frequency cannot reach 59.5 
Hz in 30 seconds, as required in Table 4.1. To mitigate the impact after the contingency, 
off-line analysis solves LSO to determine the optimal amount of load to shed.  Figure 
4.10 (b) compares the system frequencies with and without EB-UFLS. 
After the application of the EB-UFLS, the system frequency comes to a secure 
level as shown in Figure 4.10 (b). MPC is triggered after 30s when the frequencies 
almost reach their steady states. MPC curtails the load step by step. It is found that a 20-
second sampling interval δ also works well for this case. As in the 9-bus case, the 
reference frequency [ ],
h
n reff increases by
[ ]
,
h
n incf  = 0.1Hz at each MPC step When the 
frequencies reach over 59.5 Hz but less than 60.0 Hz, [ ],
h
n incf is reduced to ensure
[ ]
,
h
n reff does 
not exceed 60 Hz. The EB-UFLS (including the over-shedding) and load curtailments in 
MPC, with sufficient AGC and limited AGC, are shown in Table 4.5. Figure 4.11 shows 
the system frequency simulation results. 
Table 4.5 Load curtailments on 39-bus system 
Steps EB-UFLS MPC-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 
Time (s) 0.4 30 50 70 90 110 
MW* 99.41 48.29 48.21 48.00 47.68 15.94 
MW** 99.36 48.32 48.19 48.23 48.14 18.56 
* Sufficient AGC; ** limited AGC 
 
From the case studies on the two test systems, the load control scheme meets the 
control performance as required in Table 4.1, regardless of the limit on AGC. MPC 
curtails the load gradually in closed loop and react faster than AGC.  
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Figure 4.11 System frequencies 
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented a two-stage load control scheme. The load control 
solutions are obtained by solving LSO and MPO, respectively, coordinating wide-area 
load resources. Interruptible loads participate in the second stage of the load control 
scheme. Trajectory sensitivities interpolate the frequency trajectory variations with the 
change of loads for better computational efficiency.  
The EB-UFLS guarantees fast response to severe under-frequency conditions to 
maintain system stability with minimum time delay. Considering the weakened 
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generation-based frequency regulation due to high penetration of renewables, MPC 
using interruptible loads in the second stage provides a faster alternative to AGC.  
The contingencies considered in this chapter result in system power imbalance 
through tripping generators. The proposed load control scheme also applies to controlled 
islanding conditions, which may cause even more severe power imbalance that requires 
fast and accurate load control. 
Equation Chapter (Next) Section 1 
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5. CHAPTER 5: CONTROL DESIGN: TRANSIENT 
STABILITY CONSTRAINED OPTIMAL POWER 
FLOW AND ITS APPLICATION IN CASCADING 
OUTAGES 
This chapter introduces transient stability constrained optimal flow and its 
application in cascading outages, which fits into the framework of anticipatory 
computing introduced in chapter 3. 
NOMENCLATURE 
COI Center of inertia 
( )i k  Rotor angle (COI reference) of generator i at step k 
min/max   Minimum/Maximum rotor angle (COI reference)  
GiP  Active power production of generator i 
/i GjP 
 
Rotor angle trajectory sensitivity w.r.t. generation 
*
GjP   
Base-case dispatch of generator j for trajectory sensitivities calculation 
Tcl   Base-case fault clearing time when the trajectory sensitivities are obtained 
/i Tcl    Rotor angle trajectory sensitivity w.r.t. fault clearing time 
   Set of online generators 
n   Set of online generators at bus n 
njG   Element ij of the reduced conductance matrix 
njB   Element ij of the reduced susceptance matrix 
BS   Total number of buses 
BR   Total number of transmission lines 
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InP   Active power injection at bus n 
DnP   Active power consumption at bus n 
InQ  Reactive power injection at bus n 
DnQ   Reactive power consumption at bus n 
   Vector of voltage angles 
min/max
GiP   Limits on active power of generator i 
max
,BR kP   Limits on flow of line k  
5.1 An Efficient Transient Stability Constrained Optimal Power 
Flow using Trajectory Sensitivity 
5.1.1 Motivation and Contribution 
Optimal power flow (OPF) is used in the operation of power systems for 
reliability, security and economic efficiency. To have better control of the operation 
through dispatch and re-dispatch, tremendous improvement has been made since the 
concept of OPF was first presented in the 1960s [146]. A method is presented here to 
extend OPF so that it also includes transient stability constraints. 
Accounting for transient stability in OPF begins from the analysis of power 
system transient phenomena. Two widely used analysis tools are time-domain simulation 
and direct methods using energy functions [147]. Time-domain simulation is an effective 
and maybe the most straightforward way for transient stability assessment, but it suffers 
from its unsatisfactory time efficiency [148]. On the other hand, energy function has its 
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advantage of being fast, but its accuracy and adaptability to complexity of large systems 
with switching actions prevents its wide application in industry.  
There is previous work in implementing transient stability constrained OPF 
(TSCOPF). References [148-150] embedded the discretized integration process of time-
domain simulation into the constraints of OPF, with stability limits of rotor angles 
among the constraints. Each iteration would require simulation of a contingency, or 
many contingencies if multi-contingencies are considered. Reference [151] derived an 
equal area criterion based transient stability constraint by transforming rotor angle 
trajectories of a multi-machine system to the angle space of a single rotor angle 
trajectory of a one-machine infinite bus (OMIB). Reference [152] also used OMIB, 
along with differential evolution to search for optimal solution. Reference [33] used 
trajectory sensitivity for kinetic energy calculation and imposed energy related 
constraints to secure transient stability. Reference [34] calculated long term rotor angle 
trajectory sensitivities with respect to generation during peak hours, based on the day-
ahead scheduled dispatch, and then transient stability constraints were added to 
economic dispatch problem. 
An efficient two-step TSCOPF using trajectory sensitivities is introduced, which 
is called TSCOPF-TS. The proposed TSCOPF-TS is based on time-domain simulation. 
The simulation process in TSCOPF-TS is not embedded in the constraints or the 
objective function, but rather, it is performed external to the optimization problem, 
which allows specifically designed simulation tools to help improve the time efficiency 
of the proposed method. By using trajectory sensitivities, TSCOPF-TS avoids repetitive 
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simulations for different dispatch during the problem solving process. Also, different 
from [34] that calculates trajectory sensitivities for many hours, TSCOPF-TS calculates 
trajectory sensitivities for only several seconds, which greatly reduces the analysis error 
due to  uncertainties. 
The well-structured TSCOPF-TS suggests that its time efficiency meets the 
speed requirement in industry for dispatch to prevent the potential instability caused by 
limited credible contingencies. This is a very important step for its future application in 
industry. 
5.1.2 Procedure Description of TSCOPF-TS 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the procedure to perform TSCOPF-TS. From high-level, 
solving TSCOPF-TS needs two steps. 
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Figure 5.1 Flowchart of TSCOPF-TS 
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Step 1: Obtain transient stability constraints  
Step 2: Solve OPF with transient stability constraints 
The two steps are boxed with dashed lines in Figure 5.1.  
The next two sections explain the obtaining of the transient stability constraints 
and the formulation of TSCOPF-TS.  
5.1.3 Obtaining Transient Stability Constraint 
Transient stability constraints are the key constraints in TSCOPF-TS to improve 
transient stability. They enforce limits on the rotor angles with the center of inertia (COI) 
as reference frame, according to 
 min max( )i k     (5.1) 
The rotor angles are with respect to COI, which is 
 
( )
COI( )
i i
i
i
i
M k
k
M




 (5.2) 
Then,  
 ( ) ( ) COI( )i ik k k    (5.3) 
Obtaining those rotor angles needs time-domain simulation. And even for the same 
contingency, different dispatch will result in different rotor angle trajectories for the 
same generator. To avoid repetitive simulations for different dispatch, trajectory 
sensitivities of rotor angles with respect to generation are used. Once the rotor angle 
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trajectories for base-case dispatch are obtained, the consequential trajectories after re-
dispatch are calculated as 
 *( ) ( ) ( )( )ii i Gj Gj
j Gj
k k k P P
P

  

  

   (5.4) 
The rotor angle changes can be added up because trajectory sensitivities are linear 
sensitivities. Then for a single contingency, the corresponding discretized transient 
stability constraints are   
 *min max( ) ( )( )
i
i Gj Gj
j Gj
k k P P
P

  

   

   (5.5) 
which is expanded expression of (5.1). 
5.1.4 TSCOPF-TS Problem Formulation 
The objective function is 
 Min 2( )Gi i i Gi i Gi
i
f P a b P c P

     (5.6) 
The constraints are introduced as follows: 
1) Power balance 
 ( ), {1,..., }
n
In Gn Dn nm BS
m
P P P P n N

        (5.7) 
 ( ), {1,..., }
n
In Gn Dn nm BS
m
Q Q Q Q n N

        (5.8) 
 , {1,..., }
n
Gn Gi BS
i
P P n N

     (5.9) 
 , {1,..., }
n
Gn Gi BS
i
Q Q n N

     (5.10) 
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2) Power flow equations 
 cos( ) sin( )In n j nj n j nj n j
j
P V V G B           (5.11) 
 sin( ) cos( )In n j nj n j nj n j
j
Q V V G B           (5.12) 
3) Technical limits 
  
 min max ,Gi Gi GiP P P i     (5.13) 
 min max ,Gi Gi GiQ Q Q i     (5.14) 
 min max , {1,..., }n n n BSV V V n N      (5.15) 
 max max, , , , {1,..., }BR k BR k BR k BRP P P k N      (5.16) 
4) Other constraints 
 , {1,..., }n BSn N         (5.17) 
 0ref    (5.18) 
5) Steady State Security Constraints 
These constraints are used for preventive control of steady state contingencies, 
with constraints similar to basic ones, except the power flow equations (18) and (19) 
reflect contingency conditions [153]. The OPF with steady state security constraints is 
called the security constrained OPF (SCOPF). 
6) Transient Stability Constraints 
The transient stability constraints for first swing rotor angle stability are (5.5). 
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5.1.5 Case Studies 
Results are provided using two test systems. The tests were conducted in the 
following environment. 
Processor: Intel(R) Core(TM) 2 Duo CPU E8500 @3.16GHz 
Installed memory (RAM): 4.00 GB (3.87 usable) 
System type: 64 bit Win 7 Enterprise Service Pack 1 
Software: Fast optimal power flow (FOPF) 
FOPF is a C++ based open source code to solve both ACOPF and DCOPF. It is 
being developed at the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering of Iowa 
State University. In FOPF, constrained optimization problems are solved using built-in 
open source solvers such as IPOPT [154] and GLPK [155], or through the interfaces to 
commercial solvers such as CPLEX [156] and Gurobi [157]. FOPF automatically 
identify the type of each problem and selects the best solver. 
A. 9-Bus System 
The 9-bus system is shown in Figure 5.2. Only one contingency was considered 
in this analysis. This contingency is a fault at bus 5 end of the transmission line from bus 
5 to bus 7, cleared by tripping that line after 0.29 seconds. Table 1 compares the dispatch 
results with and without transient stability constraints considered. It can be observed 
from Table 1 that, the generation at generator 3 was decreased, compensated by 
generator 1 and 2. Also, the cost increased from 5296.69 $/hr to 5313.35 $/hr (a 0.4% 
increase), due to adding the transient stability constraints. Figure 5.3 compares the rotor 
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angle response of the three generators following the contingency, using the calculated 
dispatch with and without the transient stability constraints. Figure 5.3 shows that, the 
rotor angle stability was maintained after adding the transient stability constraints. 
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Figure 5.2 One-line diagram of 9-bus system 
 
Table 5.1 Comparison between scenarios with and without transient stability constraints 
Transient Constraints P1 (MW) P2 (MW) P3 (MW) Cost ($/hr) 
Without  82.73 131.65 104.14 5296.69 
With 89.80 134.32 94.19 5315.35 
 
It can be observed from Figure 5.3 (b) that, since it has been set that 
min 0.5 rad    
max 1.5 rad  , 
the rotor angles were just within the pre-set angle range, with small excess due to the 
interpolation error using trajectory sensitivities. Setting the range of rotor angles is based 
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on experience with the system, and commonly the range should not exceed  rad. 
 
 
(a) Rotor angles without transient stability constraints 
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(b) Rotor angles with transient stability constraints 
Figure 5.3 Rotor angle comparison between scenarios with and without transient 
stability constraints 
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B. New England 39-Bus System 
The following four scenarios were considered. 
Scenario 1 (S1): Fault at bus 3 end of the line from bus 2 to bus 3, cleared by tripping 
that line after 0.1s. 
Scenario 2 (S2): Fault at bus 16 end of the line from bus 16 to bus 21, cleared by 
tripping that line after 0.1s. 
Scenario 3 (S3): Fault at bus 17 end of the line from bus 17 to bus 27, cleared by 
tripping that line after 0.1s. 
Scenario 4 (S4): Fault at bus 26 end of the line from bus 26 to bus 28, cleared by 
tripping that line after 0.1s. 
The four scenarios were grouped into six cases to test both single-contingency 
situations and multi-contingency situations, as in Table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.2 Case description 
Case Studies 
Case A S1 
Case B S2 
Case C S3 
Case D S4 
Case E S2 + S3 
Case F S1 + S2 + S3 
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Table 5.3 TSCOPF-TS results on New England 39-bus system 
Generatio
n  
Base 
Case 
Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E Case F 
G1 (MW) 604.47 599.06 694.41 667.93 604.47 694.41 673.53 
G2 (MW) 646.00 646.00 646.00 646.00 646.00 646.00 646.00 
G3 (MW) 715.41 695.90 725.00 711.14 715.41 725.00 725.00 
G4 (MW) 652.00 652.00 652.00 652.00 652.00 652.00 652.00 
G5 (MW) 508.00 508.00 508.00 508.00 508.00 508.00 508.00 
G6 (MW) 687.00 680.11 649.67 687.00 687.00 649.67 649.47 
G7 (MW) 580.00 580.00 580.00 580.00 580.00 580.00 580.00 
G8 (MW) 564.00 654.00 564.00 564.00 564.00 564.00 564.00 
G9 (MW) 667.79 708.82 747.22 707.00 667.79 747.22 762.07 
G10 
(MW) 
674.44 666.52 538.79 579.91 674.44 538.79 545.39 
Total Cost 
($/hr) 
41941.3
4 
41965.8
0 
42228.6
9 
42042.3
6 
41941.3
4 
42228.6
9 
42236.0
9 
Cost 
Adjust. 
0 +0.06% +0.68% +0.24% 0 +0.68% 0.7% 
Time (s) 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.17 
Time 
Adjust. 
0 +43% +21% +25% +41% +98% +105% 
Binding* N/A Yes Yes Yes No N/A N/A 
* “binding” indicates if any transient stability constraint reaches equality at the solution, 
or the contingency is unstable at the dispatch while not considering transient stability 
constraints.                                         
 
There are several comments regarding the numerical results. 
1) Adding more transient stability constraints cannot improve the economic 
benefits, as observed in the cost ($/hr) from Table 5.1 and Table 5.3.  However, 
the transient stability has been maintained with less than 1% increase of cost. The 
cost increase is caused by the binding transient stability constraints, and this test 
intentionally selected some severe contingencies (3 of the 4 contingencies are 
binding) to raise the binding conditions.  
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2) Only the first swings of rotor angles were considered, so the simulation time was 
selected to be 2 seconds. If the integration time step is around 0.05 seconds, there 
will be about 40 steps for the 2 seconds. Imposing both upper and lower limits, 
there are about 80 inequality constraints for each generator of each contingency.  
3) Compared to the optimization time without contingency, there was over 100% 
time increase when considering 3 contingencies, but there was no significant 
time increase from the 2-contingency case to the 3-contingency case. Since it is 
complicated to judge the relation between the optimization time and number of 
transient contingencies under consideration, no convincing conclusion can be 
provided for now. However, considering the industry application of SCOPF, 
hundreds or even thousands of steady state security contingencies are considered 
with both power flow equations as well as inequality constraints for voltages, line 
flow and generation. The steady state security constraints of each contingency 
increase with more buses and transmission lines. On the other hand, transient 
stability related contingencies under consideration are usually much less than 
steady state security contingencies. Also, transient stability constraints of each 
contingency include only inequalities of rotor angles (about 80 inequality 
constraints for each generator of each contingency) and increase only with more 
generators [158]. Based on this analysis, the extra computational burden from 
transient stability constraints is much less than that from steady state security 
constraints.  
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5.1.6 Conclusions 
Trajectory sensitivities have been used for TSCOPF to improve the time 
efficiency. Repetitive simulations for different dispatch are avoided during the problem 
solving process. TSCOPF-TS forms a two-step algorithm. Analysis in comment 3) of 
last section shows that computational burden brought by transient stability constraints is 
much less than that from steady state security constraints. Tests on a 9-bus system and 
the New England 39-bus system show the performance of TSCOPF-TS for both single-
contingency and multi-contingency dispatch is satisfactory. 
5.2 Secure Transient Stability in Cascading Outages via Optimal 
Power Flow 
5.2.1 Motivation and Contributions 
Study of worldwide major blackouts (interruptions greater than 1 GW) involving 
cascading outages indicates that cascading progressions can be broadly classified into  
fast or slow progressions [5]. A fast progression may take only several seconds from an 
initiating event to the blackout, while slow progressions may last many minutes or even 
hours. About 50% of all major blackouts fall into the “slow” class. The slow cascading 
outages reveal similar features in the event progression [107], [100]: 
Step 1: Before the beginning of cascading, the system is in a stressed condition. Some 
lines may be tripped due to malfunction or scheduled maintenance. Many 
components are heavily loaded. 
119 
 
 
Step 2: The initiating event occurs. The system condition is further weakened.  
Step 3: The system experiences slow progression, in which components are tripped 
one after another with time intervals from several minutes up to several hours.  
Step 4: The system reaches close to its critical point of stability. A single triggering 
disturbance leads to successive tripping of many components in several 
seconds, and finally results in wide area blackouts. 
This disseration considers slow cascading outages. There are two attributes of 
slow cascading that we utilize. The first is that the time between events is sufficient to 
allow development and implementation of corrective actions. The second is that the 
component tripping events in stage 3 are dependent; therefore, avoidance of any one of 
them will interrupt and stop the cascading sequence. Reference [100] represented the 
slow cascading progressions with dynamic event trees and designed corrective OPF to 
relieve the system stress associated with circuit overload, under-voltage and over-
voltage, so as to prevent unnecessary outages due to delayed tripping of overloaded 
components. This paper extends the work of [100]  by enhancing transient stability for 
cascading defense. 
The proposed TSCOPF for cascading outages (TSCOPF-CO) is corrective, i.e., it 
is applied after an initiating event that leads the system to an alert or an emergency state, 
which is exposed to transient instability. The implementation of TSCOPF-CO is based 
on anticipatory computing [5]. The philosophy of anticipatory computing is to detect 
through simulation the potential transient instability before it occurs, and then prepare 
additional constraints for transient stability secured solutions to apply in real-time 
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cascading progression such that the transient instability is prevented. 
5.2.2 Anticipatory Computing Flowchart of TSCOPF-CO 
Figure 5.4 shows the flowchart to implement TSCOPF-CO. Under forecasted 
day-ahead operating conditions, the anticipatory computing begins with contingency 
selection, where the focus is on identifying high consequence contingencies from the 
most probable contingencies outside of those for which standard security assessment is 
done (and for which we assume post-contingency performance is acceptable).  These are 
N-k contingencies for which k ≥ 2. The contingencies are selected based on the topology 
processing approach described in [109], which accounts for bus and line faults together 
with protection failures. Contingencies are processed using a rough evaluation of their 
probability, to ensure that the most probable contingencies are processed first. These 
contingencies, together with N-1 contingencies, are considered the initiating events, and 
we perform simulation to identify system performance, which may lead to further 
component tripping. Such performance includes circuit overload or under-voltage 
(relative to emergency ratings), protective relaying operation (e.g., generator 
overexcitation, overcurrent, over- or under-voltage, over- or under-frequency, and out-
of-step relays), and unit loss of synchronism. If a violation or a relay operation is 
detected in the simulation after an initiating event, a corrective action is automatically 
designed. For example,  reference [100] reports use of OPF to design the control action, 
which was allowed to be generation re-dispatch or load curtailment, in response to 
circuit overload. However, these actions are taken to prevent secondary events from 
occurring (e.g., line sag and touch when the line is heavily loaded or generator trip 
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following a relay operation). There is also need to prevent unacceptable performance on 
occurrence of an independent secondary event, a concern that is warranted given the 
weakened condition of the network following the initiating event. Our work aims to 
equip the corrective OPF with the ability to enhance transient stability. If a secondary 
event causes transient instability, corresponding transient stability constraints are 
designed for corrective OPF to obtain a solution that prevents out-of-step conditions. 
Day ahead operating condition forecasting
N-ki contingency simulation (ki >=1)
N-ki-kj contingency simulation 
with corrective OPF application (kj >=1)
Violation?
Calculate trajectory sensitivities
Transient 
stable?
Design transient stability constraints
j end?
i end?
No
Yes
No
No
                 Wide-Area
 monitoring
 violation detection
 control application
In real time operation
j=j+1
i=i+1
Yes
Database
Corrective O
PF
solutions
Solve corrective OPF
Solve TSCOPF-CO
Scenario retrieving
Control applications
Analysis
end
N-k contingency selection
TSCOPF-CO
solutions
 
Figure 5.4 Anticipatory computing flowchart of TSCOPF-CO 
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The process of Figure 5.4 is intended to run continuously as an Energy 
Management System (EMS) function using day-ahead operating condition forecasting as 
described in [100]. The violation after the initiating event is detected if any rotor angle 
reaches out of[ , ]  . The analysis results are stored in a database together with the 
initiating contingency and the forecasted operating conditions. If an initiating event that 
has been analyzed occurs in real time, the corrective action is retrieved and either 
automatically implemented or presented to the operator as decision-support information. 
5.2.3 Formulation of Transient Stability Constraints 
TSCOPF-CO aims to maintain all rotor angles within boundaries by adding 
transient stability constraints to prevent out-of-step condition. To reflect the change of 
rotor angle response with generation levels in solving OPF , a simplified but efficient 
method is to calculate trajectory sensitivities with respect to generation levels, i.e., 
/i jP  , thus the rotor angles with enforced lower limits and upper limits are expressed 
as 
 *min max( ) ( ) ( ) ,
i
i Gj Gjj
Gj
k k P P i
P

  


      

   (5.19) 
where the overbar (-) indicates that center-of-inertia (COI) reference frame is used. For a 
detected unstable case, a stable case is needed for trajectory sensitivity calculation. We 
have developed two automated strategies to relieve the system stress to get a stable case, 
which is not necessarily optimal in dispatch but is close to the stability boundary. Either 
strategy is effective. The first strategy is to gradually reduce the generation of the 
unstable generator(s) until the system becomes stable. The generation reduction is 
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picked up equally by other generators. The second strategy, which applies for fault-type 
contingencies, is to gradually reduce the fault clearing time (TCL). Since TCL cannot be 
changed in the base case for trajectory estimation, we compensate for this change using 
rotor angle trajectory sensitivities to TCL, by adding a component ( ) /i k TCL   
TCL to the estimation equation in (5.19), where TCL is the TCL change. The rotor 
angle maximum and minimum values of the stable case are used as the limits in (5.19), 
with stability margin. Since the stable case is close to the stability boundary, the limits 
result in (almost) minimum generation cost increase while enhancing transient stability. 
In addition, the dispatch of the stable case is similar to that of the unstable case. This 
improves the error of the estimation based on trajectory sensitivities. 
5.2.4 TSCOPF-CO Formulation  
TSCOPF-CO adds additional constraints (5.19) to corrective OPF to enhance 
transient stability. Although it is certainly feasible to use ACOPF, as in [35], in this 
paper we have chosen not to, in order to take advantage of the DCOPF computational 
efficiency feeling that repeated solution of ACOPF for large systems and many 
contingencies would be prohibitively expensive computationally, even for off-line 
analysis. ACOPF application in TSCOPF-CO is a perspective that needs further 
investigation.  
The TSCOPF-CO problem statement is 
 minimize ( )Gi i Giif P b P    (5.20) 
subject to 
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 , {1,..., }In Gn Dn BSP P P n N      (5.21) 
 , {1,..., }
n
Gn Gi BSi
P P n N

     (5.22) 
 I dcP B    (5.23) 
 BRP D A      (5.24) 
 min max ,Gi Gi GiP P P i     (5.25) 
 max max, , , , {1,..., }BR k BR k BR k BRP P P k N      (5.26) 
        (5.27) 
 *min max( ) ( ) ( ) ,
i
i Gj Gjj
Gj
k k P P i
P

  


      

  (5.28) 
where BRP is a column of line flows , , {1,..., }BR k BRP k N , D is an BR BRN N  diagonal 
matrix, with negative of the branch susceptances as entries, and A is 
the ( 1)BR BSN N  node-arc incidence matrix. The key constraints in TSCOPF-CO are 
the transient stability constraints (5.28). 
Equations (5.20)-(5.28) provide a basic formulation to determine generation 
dispatch considering thermal limits. We can extend the formulation to consider other 
violations, such as under-voltage and under-frequency, by controls other than generation 
dispatch, including load curtailment and generator voltage setting. 
5.2.5 Case Studies 
A 48-machine, 140-bus simplified NPCC system is used for case studies. Figure 
5.5 shows the system one-line diagram. 
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Figure 5.5 One-line diagram of simplified NPCC 140-bus system 
 
The accuracy of estimation using trajectory sensitivities, which has been 
analyzed in [5], is first tested for the NPCC system. A contingency that involves tripping 
the faulted line 85-87 is considered. After obtaining the base-case simulation trajectories, 
the generation on bus 86 is decreased by 20%.  Figure 5.6 compares the new rotor angle 
trajectories obtained from simulation and estimation. It is observed from Figure 5.6 that, 
the estimated trajectory could match the real trajectory, especially during the first swing, 
which is the most important part for analysis. 
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Figure 5.6 Rotor angle comparison 
Contingency selection and operating condition forecasting have been performed 
for the test system. Many cascading outages are processed. Cases with transient 
instability have been automatically processed with the designed TSCOPF-CO to prevent 
out-of-step conditions. The goal of the case studies is to demonstrate the transient 
stability problems in weakened system conditions after the initiating events and the 
function of TSCOPF-CO to prevent out-of-step conditions after secondary 
contingencies. Single contingency case and multi-contingency cases are both studied. 
For an unstable case, we have used both strategies introduced in Section 5.2.3 to get a 
stable case. Similar results are obtained. We provide the results when a stable case is 
obtained by reducing TCL.  
A. Cascading Outage A 
The single contingency case is a cascading outage that begins during the peak 
hours of a day, when the system is under most stress. This cascading is initiated by a 
three-phase fault with inadvertent tripping of an additional line, followed by 
corresponding corrective action and a subsequent independent contingency. Simulation 
results have shown that the system under the forecasted operating condition is transiently 
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stable under either of the two contingencies separately. The description of the two 
contingencies follows:  
First contingency: A three-phase fault occurs on bus 85 end of line 85-88. The 
fault is successfully cleared by tripping the faulted line 85-88, resulting in increased load 
on adjacent lines carrying power generated from the generator on bus 86. No transient 
stability problem is detected for this contingency.  
Second contingency: A three-phase fault occurs on bus 85 end of line 85-105. 
The protection system trips the faulted line 85-105, causing large power swings on line 
85-86.  The generator on bus 86 loses its synchronism with the rest of the system, as 
shown in Figure 5.7(a). 
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Figure 5.7 Rotor angles in cascading outage A 
 
 
In Figure 5.7, plot (a) corresponds to rotor angles after the second contingency 
without control. Plot (b) corresponds to rotor angles after the second contingency using 
the dispatch without transient stability constraints. Plot (c) corresponds to rotors angles 
after the second contingency using the dispatch from the TSCOPF-CO solution. Plot (d) 
corresponds to rotors angles after the second contingency using the dispatch that 
decreases the original generation on bus 86 by 22%. 
After the initiating contingency, the system condition is weakened, with overload 
on several lines. Corrective OPF with thermal limits only is first calculated and applied 
before the subsequent contingency. The solution indicates that the generation on bus 86 
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is decreased by 5%. This decrease is due to overload on lines that share the flow on line 
85-88. After application of the corrective re-dispatch, subsequent contingency occurs 
and causes out-of-step condition, as shown in Figure 5.7 (b).  
Then trajectory sensitivities are calculated to formulate transient stability 
constraints for TSCOPF-CO. The TSCOPF-CO solution indicates that the generation on 
bus 86 is decreased by 24%. This decrease is shared by other generators. Figure 5.7 (c) 
shows the rotor angle transients after the second contingency, with the new dispatch 
obtained from TSCOPF-CO. 
The rotor angle limits are set as min = -0.2 rad and max =2.7 rad. To test if the 
limits are set such that the system is stable and also close to stability boundary, the 
decreased generation is changed from 24% decrease to 22%. Simulation results show 
out-of-step condition still occurs, as shown in Figure 5.7 (d), which indicates that the 
limits have been properly set 
 
B. Cascading Outage B 
Multi-contingency case is to study multiple secondary contingencies following 
the same initiating contingency, which is a three-phase fault on line 85-87. The fault is 
cleared by tripping the faulted line. Several secondary contingencies cause instability. 
They are all inadvertent-tripping contingencies, i.e., two adjacent lines are tripped and 
one of them is mis-operation. The tripped lines in the secondary contingencies are: 
(a)-{85-105(1), 85-112(1)} (b)-{85-105(2), 85-112(1)} 
(c)-{85-112(1), 83-112} (d)-{85-112(2), 83-112} 
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(e)-{88-85(1), 85-105(1)} (f)-{88-105(1), 85-105(1)},  
(g)-{88-105(2), 85-105(1)}  
The numbers behind each line indicate parallel lines. Figure 5.8 shows the out-
of-step conditions following each secondary contingency. The solution of TSCOPF-CO 
indicates that the generation on bus 86 is decreased by 26%, and this decrease is picked 
up by other generators. Figure 5.9 shows the rotor angles after TSCOPF-CO following 
each secondary contingency. 
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Figure 5.8 Rotor angles after secondary contingency without TSCOPF-CO 
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Figure 5.9 Rotor angles after secondary contingency with TSCOPF-CO 
 
5.2.6 Conclusions 
A strategy is proposed to implement TSCOPF-CO for cascading defense. 
TSCOPF-CO embeds estimated time domain simulation in constraints using trajectory 
sensitivities, to enhance transient stability in cascading outages. The proposed strategy 
has been tested on a simplified NPCC system.  
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Examining the identified cascading outages reveals that, in some cases, though the 
system could withstand a contingency, with the weakened system condition, further 
disturbance may result in transient stability problems. 
5.3 Discussion 
Traditionally, considering transient stability for remedial action was not feasible 
in industry practice because of the reaction speed requirement. In the dissertation, 
TSCOPF-CO is applicable for two reasons: (1) use of trajectory sensitivities to improve 
the computational efficiency when adding transient stability constraints, and (2) fitting 
TSCOPF into the framework of anticipatory computing.  Compared with section 5.1, 
which provides a generalized form of TSCOPF that could consider both AC and DC 
conditions, the application in cascading uses only DCOPF. In addition, the work in 
TSCOPF-CO takes a step further and solves the problem to get a stable case for 
trajectory sensitivity calculation, when only an unstable case is detected. 
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6. CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY, SOFTWARE 
IMPLEMENTATION AND CONCLUSIONS  
6.1 Summary 
The architecture of DSAPS has been proposed in the dissertation. DSAPS 
improves current online DSA practice in power industry and adds new functions. For 
this architecture, the dissertation has focused on low-probability, high-consequence 
events, i.e., large-scale blackouts, which involve cascading outages. The framework of 
ACS is designed to defend against cascading outages. DCAT, the control design engine 
of ACS, determine corrective actions to address system performance violations that 
occur in cascading outages. Trajectory sensitivity analysis serves the control design in 
DCAT. The dissertation introduces some controls within DCAT, including CSCOPF, a 
two-stage load control scheme and a TSCOPF that has been extended for cascading 
defense (TSCOPF-CO).  
The applications of trajectory sensitivity analysis in power systems have been 
reviewed and summarized. An important application of trajectory sensitivity for 
assessment is the design of an index (V-CCT) that quantitatively assesses transient 
voltage dips after high-consequence contingencies. Considering the nonlinearity that 
affects the trajectory sensitivity based trajectory estimation, two strategies, i.e., SOTS 
and SOS method, have been presented and tested.  
ACS automates security problem detection and corrective control design to 
mitigate the system stress in cascading outages. The two working modes of ACS 
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supplement each other and prepare corrective controls for security problems. The 
formulation of CSCOPF has been presented to determine dispatch, load shedding and 
generator voltage set points. 
Besides CSCOPF, other controls are designed for ACS and introduced in the 
dissertation. A two-stage load control scheme for severe under-frequency conditions has 
been proposed. The first stage is based on anticipatory computing that prepares event-
based UFLS determined by solving mixed integer programming optimization. The fast 
reaction of event-based control guarantees system stability after high-consequence 
events. The second stage further recovers the frequencies with model predictive control 
using interruptible loads by solving a linear programming problem at each control step. 
OPF problem has been extended in the dissertation to consider transient stability. 
Trajectory sensitivity based transient stability constraints are designed and added to OPF 
that enhances power system transient stability through dispatch. The added constraints 
avoid integration of system dynamics in the OPF formulation, thus improve the 
computational efficiency. A further step is taken to implement TSCOPF in cascading 
outages to consider situations when transient stability occurs due to weakened system 
condition in the cascading progression. 
It should be noted that, although the linear programming based on trajectory 
sensitivity analysis changes parameters of the system in the optimization iteration, the 
dynamic system under consideration is time-invariant system. This is because the 
optimization at each iteration step evaluates the trajectories with fixed parameters.  
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6.2 Software Implementation 
Implementing DSAPS/ACS requires revised software in certain ways. A 
MATLAB program has been developed to implement all function of ACS. Figure 6.1 
shows the functional diagram of ACS for cascading defense.  
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Figure 6.1 Functional diagram of anticipatory computing system for cascading defense 
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Computing speed is an important issue in the ACS implementation. Besides the 
MATLAB programs for prototype demonstration, a C++ high-speed extended-term 
time-domain simulation program and a C++ optimal power flow program are being 
developed for industrial application in the near future.  
Figure 6.2 shows the computational complexity of DSAPS/ACS implementation 
[100]. 
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Figure 6.2 Computational complexity of DSAPS  
 
 Extended-term time-domain simulation 
ACS in emergency mode performs extended-term time-domain simulation for 
massive contingencies and is required to run faster than real time. Figure 6.3 shows the 
hierarchical decision layers to design an efficient software program to achieve the 
computational requirements [95].   
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Figure 6.3 Hierarchical decision layers to design efficient extended-term time domain 
simulation 
 
HSET-TDS, or HSET, is a C++ open source software program for extended-term 
time-domain simulation. HSET can simulate both transients of several seconds and slow 
dynamics of several minutes or even hours. Various dynamic components are included 
in HSET, including different generator models, governors and voltage regulators. Both 
explicit methods and implicit methods are built into HSET to solve DAE for system 
dynamics. For extended-term time-domain simulation, HSET uses implicit methods and 
variable integration time steps. And a variable-order-variable-time-step Backward 
Differential Formula (BDF) [159] method has been implemented to speed up the 
simulation. In addition, many linear solvers have been implemented in HSET and tested 
for implicit methods, including KLU [160], Umfpack[161], SuperLU [162] and Pardiso 
[163].    
 Fast Optimal Power Flow (FOPF) 
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Figure 5.3 shows the modularized structure used to design FOPF. This figure 
also shows the whole process how an OPF problem is solved. 
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Figure 6.4 Structure of FOPF 
 
FOPF is a C++ open source software program to solve both DC and AC OPF 
problems. FOPF incorporates the best open source linear and nonlinear unconstrained 
optimization solvers to achieve its best efficiency. FOPF provides driver interfaces to 
commercial optimization solvers: Gurobi and MATLAB. Object-oriented and 
modularized design makes FOPF open for further improvement, because each module of 
FOPF has its own specific functionality and provides standard interface to other modules 
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or users. Especially, adding more solvers is quite convenient if the solver libraries are 
offered. A review of the archived literature shows that, FOPF is the first C++ open 
source OPF solver. 
6.3 Conclusions 
ACS is a model-based framework. The accuracy of the model affects the analysis 
and the control performance. EMS provides and maintains the model of the large-scale 
complex system, including the network configuration, dynamic component parameters 
and the updated changes in real time.  
ACS in online mode addresses all the events that have been identified in 
anticipatory analysis. The identified events include both N-1 and N-k (k ≥ 2) 
contingencies. ACS in emergency mode addresses the events not identified in 
anticipatory analysis, using faster-than-real-time simulation. Each designed corrective 
control has been verified in simulation before application in real time. 
 In the online mode of ACS, a corrective action applies only when the real-time 
operating condition matches the operating condition under which the corrective action is 
designed in anticipatory analysis. If (1) the system after the correction action does not 
behave as expected in simulation due to such as model mismatch, (2) the operating 
condition progresses to an unexpected state or (3) an unexpected event occurs in the 
cascading progression, ACS triggers the emergency mode in which every control design 
is based on the real-time operating condition and short-term forecasting. This avoids the 
accumulation of error, which can lead to unacceptable difference between the modeled 
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performance and the actual performance, and thus possible wrong control decisions that 
may even worsen the system performance.  
ACS designs, manages and coordinates centralized corrective actions, and this is 
an automatic process. A system with many corrective controls is very complex because 
each action can lead the system to different states: state 1- no failure mode, state 2 – fail 
to operate when desirable, and state 3 – operation is undesirable.  Figure 6.5 shows the 
relation of control states to operation and non-operation. Both state 2 and 3 are 
considered as unexpected events and analyzed in the emergency mode of ACS. 
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control 
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Corrective 
control does not 
operate
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Figure 6.5 Relation of control states to operation and non-operation 
 
ACS does not compete with the current trend of wide-area monitoring and 
control using real-time phasor measurements. Rather, ACS utilizes them for online 
monitoring, performance violation detection, and initialization of simulation–based 
analysis in the emergency mode. 
Running ACS does not increase the operational cost of power grid because the 
corrective controls do not apply until an initiating event occurs. In case of an event that 
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may initiate a cascading outage, the grid will benefit from ACS that can interrupt the 
cascading outage and avoid a large-scale blackout, such as the U.S. Northeast blackout 
of 2003. 
With state-of-the-art fast computing and communication technologies, DSAPS 
can do more than what is being done in current power industry. ACS, the idea being 
used by other industry areas (e.g. airline, nuclear and process control) addresses the 
online DSA of low-probability, high-consequence events, and prepares the modern 
power grid for potential large-scale blackout without affecting its normal operation. 
Though the corrective controls are rarely applied by ACS due to the low probability of 
the targeted events, the highly integrated structure of ACS/DCAT with detailed system 
model and control design engine can provide support or training to protection engineers 
for comprehensive system study and decision-making. 
DSAPS, especially ACS, needs constant improvement for successful industrial 
implementation. 
 The speed of extended-term time-domain simulation is still a critical constraint in 
the analysis for large-scale systems. Multi-contingency simulation in anticipatory 
analysis for the online mode can be operationally parallelized, e.g., simulating 
contingencies in different cores, because each contingency is independent of 
others. Simulation for the emergency mode, on the other hand, demands further 
hardware and software (e.g., algorithms in numerical integration, nonlinear 
solver, and linear solver) enhancement. Faster simulation (less SRTR) means 
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earlier awareness of system performance violation and thus earlier corrective 
actions to interrupt the cascading outages.  
 The framework of ACS needs development of the most effective controls for all 
performance violations in cascading outages. Human operational experience is 
important in the early stage of the ACS implementation to help setup this 
automated system. 
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